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INTRODUCTION 
A guy walks into a bar.  It’s a dingy neighborhood bar replete 
with a pool table, unattractive stained glass windows, aging 
barflies and a cranky bartender.  “Hiya Homer,” the bartender 
grumbles.  This greeting is echoed by a corpulent, toad-like bar 
regular named Barney who punctuates it with a seismic belch.  
Welcome to Moe’s Tavern.  Location: Springfield, the fictional 
setting of the long-running television series, The Simpsons. 
In between dispensing questionable advice, falling victim to a 
series of crank phone calls, pointing a shotgun at patrons and 
indulging in the occasional get-rich-quick scheme, Moe serves 
Duff, the local beer.  Duff enjoys an enviable market position in 
Springfield, the apparent result of an aggressive marketing 
campaign.  Duff’s empire includes its several labels (Duff, Duff 
Dry, Duff Lite, Duff Dark, Raspberry Duff, Tartar Control Duff); 
Duff Gardens, a theme park; Duff Man, a flamboyant spokesman 
with a cape and a beer-toting belt and even a spokes-shark named 
Duff McShark.  Duff advertises on television and in print (Moe’s 
Tavern is positively plastered with advertising for the beer) and 
gives tours of its brewery.  The beer sports a logo, instantly 
recognizable to fans of the show and to the residents of Springfield 
alike, featuring elongated black lettering against a red, white and 
tan background. 
Duff’s brand is characterized by crass marketing and less-than-
stringent production standards.1  Even the name connotes qualities 
few would seek out in a beer or with which they would wish to be 
associated.2  Here in the real world, “most consumers know the 
fictional drink is a parody of the kind of mass-produced beer found 
 
 1 In one episode of The Simpsons, “Duffless,” Homer visits the Duff brewery where 
an inspector removes bottles of Duff from an assembly line containing a rat, a syringe 
and a human nose.  On this trip, it is also revealed that Duff, Duff Dry and Duff Lite are 
all the same beer.  The Simpsons: Duffless (Fox television broadcast Feb. 18, 1993). 
 2 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 
465 (Austl.) (“The word [Duff] is used in relation to golf to refer to striking a ball 
clumsily or failing to play a shot.  The word ‘duffer,’ which is perhaps more relevant, 
connotes a plodding, stupid or incompetent person.”); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 553 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that “duff” is a slang 
term for “buttocks”), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/duff. 
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throughout the U.S.”3 Because of Duff’s fame on The Simpsons, 
however, those same qualities which suggest the shoddiness of the 
beer in the fictional world of Springfield have created a sizeable 
market for a Duff Beer here in the real world. 
Enter Rodrigo Contreras.  A “marketing man” who has “always 
had an eye for a gimmick,”4 Mr. Contreras is the owner of 
Simpson’s Brewing Company, a Tijuana-based brewery 
manufacturing his own Duff Beer5 whose label is “practically the 
same as the design on the cans in the cartoon.”6  Contreras stresses 
that the brewery’s name “is a coincidence.”7  Because he concedes 
that the idea to manufacture Duff Beer occurred to him while 
watching an episode of The Simpsons in 2002,8 however, that 
assertion may strike some as difficult to swallow.  Contreras 
presently sells in Mexico and Europe but aims to expand into the 
United States as well.9  While Fox would not comment on any 
legal action it may or may not be contemplating against Simpson’s 
Brewing Company when interviewed about Contreras’ Duff Beer 
in December 2009, it simply stated that “The Simpsons is a 
Twentieth Century Fox property, and Fox owns the rights to The 
Simpsons universe. We intend to protect our rights.”10  This is 
almost certainly a credible threat.  In 1996, Fox won a preliminary 
injunction against two Australian breweries for manufacturing a 
product called “Duff Beer”11 and the company has initiated 
lawsuits against several other breweries around the world seeking 
to manufacture their very own Duff Beer without a license from 
Fox.12  If Fox’s saber rattling is any indication, courts will likely 
 
3 Homer Simpson’s Beer Bubbles to Life, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www. 
ft.com/cms/s/0/81d13ac8-e03e-11de-8494-00144feab49a.html?. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Cerveza Duff de Mexico, DUFF INC., http://www.duffdemexico.com (last visited May 
20, 2010). 
 6 Homer Simpson’s Beer Bubbles to Life, supra note 3.  
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 452 
(Austl.); see infra Part II.A.2. 
 12 Eriq Gardner, Why Hasn’t Fox Sued the Makers of Duff Beer?, HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Dec. 7, 2009, 2:06 AM), http://thresq.hollywoodreporter.com/2009/12/fox-
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soon have occasion to revisit the issue of real-life protection for 
fictional trademarks.  But when they do, what harm could Fox 
allege? 
Because Duff is a trademark, albeit a fictional one, a natural 
first impulse would be to look to trademark law.  This body of law 
seeks to reward producers who, like the fictional Duff, make 
efforts to build a strong brand.  Indeed, assuming that United 
States federal law applies in the fictional world of Springfield, 
Duff has an easy case against a rival fictional manufacturer calling 
itself Duff and manufacturing beer, or even shoes.  But what 
happens when a real manufacturer attempts the same thing?  Can 
trademark (or some other form of intellectual property protection) 
furnish a remedy for the creator of a fictional mark when a real-
world user trades on the good will of the mark by recreating the 
fictional product in the real world?  Or put another way, can a real-
world producer get away with manufacturing Duff Beer? 
This Note argues that it cannot.  Two federal courts in the 
United States and Australia who have adjudged the issue agree, 
finding that such conduct constitutes a trademark injury.  However, 
the appropriation of a fictional mark is no ordinary trademark 
injury.  Because Duff is a creative aspect of a fictional work, the 
courts could have plausibly concluded that its appropriation is 
actually copyright infringement.  Indeed, Fox appears to suffer two 
different injuries depending on one’s perspective. 
From inside Springfield (what this Note will call the “internal 
perspective”), when a second comer markets a beer called “Duff,” 
we appear to have a classic trademark injury: a latter market 
entrant or “junior user” trading on the good will built up by the 
senior user of the mark.13  But things look very different outside 
 
duff-beer-trademark.html; see also S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 457 (noting that 
“Fox has consistently refused to grant licenses to parties who have sought to use ‘The 
Simpsons’ in connection with alcohol and tobacco products, or other substances 
considered detrimental to children”). 
 13 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006); see also Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 
186 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26.01[1] (4th ed. 1996)) (defining senior user 
and junior user as the first and second seller, respectively, to adopt and use a trademark in 
the United States). 
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Springfield.  From our perspective here in the real world (which 
this Note will call the “external perspective”), Duff Brewery does 
not exist at all.  Instead, Duff Beer is part of a rich, fictional 
universe and preventing the unauthorized duplication of the 
expressive aspects of that world seems more properly to be the 
domain of copyright law.  Both of these areas of intellectual 
property law have intuitive appeal but both pose doctrinal hurdles 
fictional marks may not be able to surmount.  For a symbol to be a 
viable trademark it must be used in commerce to distinguish the 
seller’s goods from goods made by others, but to say that Duff 
Beer has been used in commerce is literally to indulge in fiction.  
Similarly, while copyright law protects original expression as soon 
as that expression is fixed in a tangible medium, under its de 
minimis doctrine, copyright does not protect “words and short 
phrases.”14  As Homer Simpson would say, “D’oh!” 
The reasoning of the few courts to consider fictional trademark 
injuries is in many ways instructive in understanding the puzzle 
posed by fictional trademarks.  But the courts ultimately paper 
over the tug between perspectives and doctrines, hinting at a role 
copyright might play while locating the injury under traditional 
trademark law.  As a result, it remains unclear analytically, if not 
legally, what harm Fox suffers when Contreras sells his Duff Beer 
and whether existing trademark or copyright doctrine, standing 
alone, provides a remedy. 
This Note proposes a doctrinal approach to cloaking deserving 
fictional trademarks with intellectual property protection.  Part I 
describes the legal contours of relevant trademark and copyright 
law.  Part II.A considers the fictional trademark problem as a 
trademark injury and presents two cases which have viewed it as 
such; Part II.B considers the possibility that a fictional trademark 
injury is actually a copyright injury in disguise and points to 
aspects of those two cases in which the courts appear to talk 
trademark but walk copyright.  Part III locates the injury under 
traditional trademark law but adapts the trademark analysis to the 
particulars of the fictional trademark problem—in part, by 
incorporating relevant analytical principles from copyright.  This 
 
14 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2010). 
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Note then discusses how the two cases would come out under this 
tailored trademark framework and analyzes a few other fictional 
trademark scenarios. 
I. THE DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE 
A. Trademark 
Trademarks are governed by both state common law and 
federal statutory law.  The Lanham Act of 1946,15 a federal statute, 
affords qualifying marks nationwide protection upon registration.16  
Unregistered marks are protected by state common law and are 
subject to more geographically limited protection.17 
The term “trademark,” as defined in the Lanham Act, “includes 
any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof . . . 
used by a person, or . . . which a person has a bona fide intention to 
use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register 
established by [the Lanham] Act, to identify and distinguish his or 
her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or 
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”18  As the Supreme Court has explained, the 
“‘requirements for qualification of a word or symbol as a 
trademark’ are that it be (1) a ‘symbol,’ (2) ‘use[d] . . . as a mark,’ 
(3) ‘to identify and distinguish the seller’s goods from goods made 
or sold by others,’ but that it not be ‘functional.’”19 
Trademark law is bottomed on a consumer protection rationale.  
As the Supreme Court has explained, 
 
 15 Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006). 
 16 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).  
 17 See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 19:1–9 (4th ed. 2010). 
 18 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office, the federal registrar 
of trademarks, have construed the word “symbol” broadly and “authorized for use as a 
mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound (of NBC’s three 
chimes) and even a particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread).” Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
 19 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166 (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.01[1], at 3-2, § 7.26, at 7-113 (3d ed. 1994)).   
C04_ARROW_011111_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2011  4:07 PM 
2010] FICTIONAL TRADEMARKS 117 
In principle, trademark law, by preventing others 
from copying a source-identifying mark, reduces 
the customer’s costs of shopping and making 
purchasing decisions for it quickly and easily 
assures a potential customer that this item—the item 
with the mark—is made by the same producer as 
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or 
disliked) in the past.  At the same time, the law 
helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-
related rewards associated with a desirable product.  
The law thereby encourages the production of 
quality products and simultaneously discourages 
those who hope to sell inferior products by 
capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to 
evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.20 
Thus, to the extent that trademark law seeks to disincentivize 
an “imitating competitor” from reaping “financial” and 
“reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product,” 
this goal is subservient to the ultimate aim of protecting consumers 
by preventing confusion in the marketplace.21  Accordingly, 
trademark law looks favorably upon efforts such as those 
employed by the fictional Duff to create and promote a strong, 
distinctive mark and provides a relatively low threshold to 
establish rights in a mark.22  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
provides a cause of action against the user of a mark in commerce 
whose use “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship or 
 
 20 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64 (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 21 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64. 
 22 See id. at 162 (“The language of the Lanham Act describes [the universe of things 
that can qualify as a trademark] in the broadest of terms.  It says that trademarks 
“includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof.”).  Compare 
15 U.S.C. § 1127, with 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (requiring that a product be novel, useful, 
non-obvious and sufficiently described by the applicant in such a way as to enable others 
to make and use the invention to receive patent protection). 
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approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person.”23 
Because of its focus on preventing marketplace confusion, 
trademark law favors marks which are distinctive and thus easily 
recognizable by consumers.  In assessing distinctiveness “[c]ourts 
and commentators have traditionally divided potential trademarks 
into four categories.  A potential trademark may be categorized as 
(1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) arbitrary or 
fanciful.”24  A generic term is “the name of a particular genus or 
class of which an individual article or service is but a member”25 
and “if at any time a mark becomes generic as to a particular 
product or service, the mark’s registration is subject to 
cancellation.”26  Examples of marks which have become generic 
include Aspirin27 and Murphy Bed.28  A descriptive term 
“identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service.”29  
Descriptive terms are not protectable as marks in their descriptive 
sense, that is, when they describe the products with which they are 
associated.  They may, however, become distinctive “by acquiring 
a secondary meaning in the minds of the consuming public,”30 that 
is, “when in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a 
product feature . . . is to identify the source of the product rather 
than the product itself.”31  Chap Stick32 and Instant Messenger33 
are descriptive marks.  A suggestive mark “suggests, rather than 
describes, some particular characteristic of the goods or services to 
which it applies and requires the consumer to exercise the 
 
 23 Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 24 Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). 
 27 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
 28 Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 29 Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 790 (quoting Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 
(5th Cir. 1979)). 
 30 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
 31 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (quoting Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 (1982)). 
 32 Morton Mfg. Corp. v. Delland Corp., 166 F.2d 191 (C.C.P.A. 1948). 
 33 In re Am. Online Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1618 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (concluding that 
petitioner’s mark, “Instant Messenger,” was “registrable on the Principal Register 
because it has acquired distinctiveness under . . . the Trademark Act”). 
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imagination in order to draw a conclusion as to the nature of the 
goods and services.”34  The term “Coppertone” as applied to sun-
tanning products has been held to be suggestive.35  Arbitrary or 
fanciful marks “bear no relationship to the products or services to 
which they are applied.”36  Kodak37 and Exxon38 are fanciful 
marks.  Suggestive marks and arbitrary or fanciful marks are 
considered to be inherently distinctive without proof of secondary 
meaning.39 
Trademark law requires not only that a mark be sufficiently 
distinctive, but that it have established priority in a given 
marketplace.  This body of law thus follows the ancient maxim 
“first in time, first in right” with the first user of an inherently 
distinctive mark having priority over latter users and the first 
descriptive mark to acquire secondary meaning having priority 
over other such marks.40  “Only active use” of a mark in commerce 
“allows consumers to associate a mark with particular goods and 
notifies other firms that the mark is so associated.”41  Judge 
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit explained that the purpose of 
the rule is to “reward[] those who act quickly in getting new 
products in the hands of consumers.”42  Indeed, as Professors 
Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis note, “[a]bsent consumers 
coming to associate a mark with a particular source, there would be 
no reason to confer trademark rights on a particular trader.”43  
Thus, the use in commerce requirement, far from being a mere 
procedural formality, limits protection to marks which consumers 
have come to identify with a given source or producer. 
 
 34 Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791 (internal citations omitted).  
 35 Id.; see Douglas Labs. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954). 
 36 Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791.  
 37 Id.; see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930); see also 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 38 Exxon Corp. v. XOIL Energy Res., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 39 Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791. 
 40 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
16:1 (4th ed. 2010).  
 41 Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).   
 42 Id. at 504. 
 43 Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in 
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1612 (2007). 
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The issue of whether a use of a mark is sufficient to constitute 
a use in commerce is made “on a case by case basis” and turns on 
“the totality of the circumstances.”44  Unsurprisingly then, it is not 
clear whether use in a work of fiction is sufficient to reserve 
priority rights in a mark here in the real world. 
Many elements of fictional works are protectable under 
trademark law.  For example, in In re DC Comics,45 a seminal case 
on modern trademark interpretation, the court held that a graphic 
character can function as a protectable mark.46  In that case, DC 
Comics appealed from a decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) refusing 
trademark registration for drawings of three of DC’s comic book 
characters which appeared on the packaging for action figures of 
those characters.47  TTAB reasoned that the drawings were “so 
descriptive” of the figures within that they were “not 
trademarks.”48  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the 
Federal Circuit) reversed.  That court reasoned that: 
[w]hatever information a drawing of Superman or 
Batman or Joker might convey to the average 
prospective purchaser regarding a doll resembling 
one of the related fictional characters is wholly 
dependent on appellant’s efforts to associate each 
character in the public’s awareness with numerous 
attributes, including a single source of 
sponsorship.49 
The court thus concluded that the “information-conveying 
aspect of the drawing” did not “conclusively eliminate its possible 
trademark role” finding instead that DC’s efforts to link the 
characters and the brand in the public mind were the critical factor 
which enabled the fictional characters to serve as trademarks.50 
 
 44 Johnny Blastoff, Inc., v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 1999); 
see also New W. Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 45 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 46 Id. at 1045. 
 47 Id. at 1043. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1044. 
 50 Id. 
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Similarly, other prominent elements of fictional works have 
been held to constitute independent trademarks.  For example, in 
DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates,51 DC Comics, again in 
the role of plaintiff, sued an animation studio which created 
television shows for it and others.  Proceeding on a trademark 
infringement theory, DC alleged that Filmation’s series Manta and 
Moray and Superstretch infringed trademarks in the characters 
Aquaman and Plastic Man which starred in DC’s cartoon series.52  
The court found for DC, holding that: 
[w]here the product sold by plaintiff is 
“entertainment” in one form or another, then not 
only the advertising of the product but also an 
ingredient of the product itself can amount to a 
trademark protectable under § 43(a) [of the Lanham 
Act] because the ingredient can come to symbolize 
the plaintiff or its product in the public mind.53 
The court noted that protectable ingredients included “the 
names and nicknames of entertainment characters, as well as their 
physical appearances and costumes” but did not include a fictional 
character’s “physical abilities or personality traits” since these 
were capable of “an infinite number of possible visible and audible 
manifestations” and thus lacked the “consistency of 
representation” required for a mark to serve as a reliable indicator 
of source in the public mind.54 
Similarly, in DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp.,55 the court found 
the fictional element “Kryptonite” from DC’s Superman series to 
be “an element associated with Superman entertainment products” 
and thus entitled to trademark protection.56  Notably, in its defense, 
Kryptonite argued that DC Comics, by featuring Kryptonite in the 
Superman story “for narrative” and as a “fictitious substance to 
enhance the story” had “never used the mark in commerce . . . to 
 
 51 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
52  Id. 
 53 Id. at 1277. 
 54 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 55 336 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 56 Id. at 332. 
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identify or designate the source of a real product or service.”57  The 
court rejected this argument, finding that “[a]s a result of broad 
dissemination throughout all media, the fictional element 
Kryptonite, including its graphic depiction, has come to be 
recognized as a powerful symbol, and is immediately recognized 
or associated with the character Superman.”58  The Kryptonite 
court thus seemed to hold that use of a fictional mark within a 
work of fiction, without more, may be sufficient to reserve priority 
in the mark.  However, it is unclear if the court would have 
reached the same result without DC having also licensed 
Kryptonite to appear on merchandise. 
Beyond whether or not the mark has been used in commerce, 
the principal constraint on the establishment of trademark rights is 
the extent to which such use has occurred.  The extent of the use 
sufficient to reserve priority rights in a mark varies depending on 
whether or not the mark is registered.59  While common law 
requires “substantial sales” to put other firms on notice that a given 
mark is already associated with a source of goods, “[r]egistration 
[of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office] 
modifies this system slightly, allowing slight sales plus notice in 
the register to substitute for substantial sales without notice.”60  In 
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal S.A.,61 the Seventh Circuit explained that 
this system “prevents entrepreneurs from reserving brand names in 
order to make their rivals’ marketing more costly” and lets “others 
 
 57 Id. at 331. 
 58 Id. at 332. 
 59 Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 60 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006)).  The requirement that a mark be used in 
commerce before it can be registered was relaxed somewhat with the passage of the 
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1989 (“TLRA”) Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051.  Under the TLRA, the creator of a mark who has “a bona 
fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use [the] 
trademark in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal 
register.” 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1).  This intent-to-use registration still requires that a bona 
fide use in commerce take place within six months (extendable up to three years for good 
cause shown) of the issuance of an approval (a “notice of allowance”) by the Patent and 
Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2).  Failure to use the mark in commerce within 
this period results in abandonment of the application. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(4). 
 61 979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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know that they should not invest resources to develop a mark 
similar to one already used in the trade.”62 
In addition to serving as indicators of source, trademarks 
communicate the experiential and psychological qualities of a 
given product.  Professor McCarthy states that “each product goes 
to market with a ‘psychic load’ of intangible and non-utilitarian 
psychological factors” and argues that the communication of such 
experiential information to consumers “must be recognized when 
considering the legal issues of ‘likelihood of confusion’ and 
‘dilution’ of the effect of a given trademark.”63  Thus, an important 
aspect of trademark law is its protection of the economic value of 
consumers’ positive psychological reaction to a firm and its 
trademark known as the firm’s “good will.”64  Trademark law, 
then, protects not just the consumer, but “the businessman who has 
gained a strategic advantage through building up of good will, 
against unfair practices by competitors who desire to poach on this 
good will.”65  With the advent of modern branding, trademarks 
have taken on lives of their own, becoming objects of consumer 
adoration even independent of any particular products with which 
they may be associated.66  Good will has thus become a valuable 
intellectual property asset in its own right; the estimated value of 
Coca-Cola’s trademark, for example, independent of any of its 
tangible assets is estimated to be approximately $24 billion.67 
 
 62 Id. at 503. 
 63 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
2:37 (4th ed. 2010). 
 64 Id. § 2:17. 
 65 Id. § 2:17 (quoting E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 
1943)). 
 66 See generally Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 
(1993). 
 67 Legislation: Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws, 44 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 585, 586 (1992); see also Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 
Emory L.J. 461, 461 (2005) (“Trademark merchandising is big business.  One marketing 
consultant estimated the global market for licensing and marketing sports-related 
merchandise at $17 billion in 2001.  The college-logo retail market was estimated at $3 
billion in 2003.  The 2002 Salt Lake Olympics generated $500 million in gross sales—
and $34 million in licensing revenues—from sale of ‘Olympics’ attire.”) (internal 
citations omitted).   
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In addition to protecting trademarks which are inherently 
distinctive or which have acquired secondary meaning, the 
Lanham Act also protects a product’s trade dress, that is, “the total 
image of a business.”68  Trade dress is protectable upon the same 
basis as trademarks; inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable 
absent a showing of secondary meaning.69 
In order to make out a cause of action for trademark 
infringement a plaintiff must establish that: 
 It has a valid mark that is entitled to protection 
under the Lanham Act; and that 
 The defendant used the mark, 
 In commerce 
 In connection with the sale . . . or advertising of 
goods or services 
 Without the plaintiff’s consent70 
and that such use ‘“is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of [the defendant] with [the 
plaintiff], or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the 
defendant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by [the 
plaintiff].”71 
There are thus two discreet “use in commerce” analyses in 
trademark law: one for the senior user to determine if its use 
suffices to establish priority rights in a mark, and one for the junior 
user to determine if its use infringes.  These are quite separate and 
distinct.  While the priority analysis requires slight sales plus 
registration or more significant sales in the absence of registration, 
many significant uses by a junior user will be considered “fair 
uses” such that they employ the senior user’s mark without 
infringing the senior user’s trademark rights.  Such fair uses 
 
 68 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 n.1 (1992).   
 69 See id. at 774 (noting that “[p]rotection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, 
serves the Act’s purpose to ‘secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business 
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers’”).   
 70 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006). 
 71 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)). 
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include the senior user’s mark having become generic,72 the senior 
user’s abandonment of its mark,73 and “nominative” fair uses such 
as descriptive use (including comparative advertising or news 
reporting), parody and free speech rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.74  Indeed, as Professors Dinwoodie and Janis note, “a 
teleological analysis of trademark law would suggest that the 
concept of use sufficient to establish rights might differ radically 
from the type of use by a defendant that might give rise to 
infringement.”75  Thus, while courts and commentators differ as to 
what constitutes a “use in commerce” for infringement purposes,76 
section 45 of the Lanham Act makes clear that, for purposes of the 
priority analysis, “[t]he term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona 
 
 72 See, e.g., The Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 97 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (holding that the term “Murphy bed” is “a generic term, having been 
appropriated by the public to designate generally a type of bed”). 
 73 See, e.g., Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. 
Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the baseball team “the Brooklyn Dodgers” had 
abandoned trademark rights in its name upon moving to Los Angeles such that a junior 
user’s restaurant entitled “The Brooklyn Dodger” was a noninfringing use). 
 74 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that the defendant’s song “Barbie Girl” was a noninfringing parody of plaintiff Mattel’s 
doll of the same name); see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 
29 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized 
use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view.”). 
 75 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 43, at 1613. 
 76 Compare Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through 
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1673–74 (2007) (arguing that abolishing the 
requirement that a trademark be used “as a mark” in order to infringe would “severely 
limit a whole host of legitimate but unauthorized uses of [a trademark holder’s mark] 
particularly (but not exclusively) in the online context”) with Dinwoodie & Janis, supra 
note 43, at 1603 (arguing that “limiting liability to trademark use, as that term is 
understood by its proponents, will . . . result in insufficient marketplace regulation”).  
Similarly, courts are split with regard to the issue of whether use in public discourse to 
“sell” a political message constitutes a use in commerce under the infringement analysis. 
Compare Lucasfilm v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing 
complaint of petitioner Lucasfilm alleging that public interest groups’ use of the phrase 
“star wars” to persuade the public of their respective viewpoints of the Reagan 
Administration’s strategic defense initiative through television messages constituted 
trademark infringement) with United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand Am. N.Y., 
Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997) (“‘use in commerce’ denotes Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause rather than an intent to limit the Act’s application 
to profitmaking activity.”). 
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fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made 
merely to reserve a right in a mark.”77 
While the tests for likelihood of confusion employed by the 
different federal circuit courts of appeal vary, most circuits employ 
a non-exhaustive, multi-factor test with no one factor dispositive, 
such as that used by the Ninth Circuit.78  Factors examined by the 
Ninth Circuit include: 
 Strength of the mark; 
 Proximity of the goods; 
 Similarity of the marks; 
 Evidence of actual confusion; 
 Marketing channels used; 
 Type of goods and the degree of care likely to 
be exercised by the purchaser; 
 Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 
 Likelihood of expansion of the product lines79 
Trademarks enjoy even more robust protection under the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1998 (“FTDA”).80  This statute 
protects “[t]he owner of a famous mark . . . against another 
person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if 
such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”81  As Judge 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, “[t]o be 
dilutive, use of the mark need not bring to mind the junior user 
alone.  The distinctiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no 
longer brings to mind the senior user alone.”82  Notably, when 
 
 77 Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 78 See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part 
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 79 Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d at 348–49.  The Second Circuit’s likelihood of confusion 
test, based on Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), 
is nearly identical. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 
115 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 80 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 81 Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
 82 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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proceeding under a dilution theory, a plaintiff need not prove 
likelihood of consumer confusion or mistake as to source.83 
B. Copyright 
Unlike trademark, whose constitutional authorization is 
embedded in the Commerce Clause, copyright derives its authority 
from Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, the Intellectual 
Property Clause, which states: “The Congress shall have the power 
. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”84  In the 
modern seminal case interpreting this constitutional provision, 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services,85 the Supreme 
Court explained that “[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to 
reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’”86   
Copyright protects “original works of authorship” as soon as 
they are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”87  Works of 
authorship include “literary” and “dramatic works,” as well as 
“motion pictures and other audiovisual works.”88  The Supreme 
Court has explained that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is 
originality”89 and that “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, 
means only that the work was independently created by the author . 
. . and that it possesses some minimal degree of creativity. . . . 
 
 83 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous 
mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to 
an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become 
famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause 
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the 
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic 
injury.”) (emphasis added). 
 84 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 85 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 86 Id. at 349.  In so holding, the court expressly rejected the theory that a telephone 
directory was entitled to copyright protection on the basis of the labor expended by the 
compiler of the directory. Id. at 362 (“[t]he selection, coordination, and arrangement of 
Rural’s white pages do not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright 
protection.”).  
 87 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
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[T]he requisite degree of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice.”90 
Copyright thus protects minimally creative artistic expression, 
but it does not protect the underlying idea itself.91  Accordingly, 
where there is only one, or there are very few ways of expressing 
an idea, the idea and the expression are said to “merge” and the 
expression is rendered uncopyrightable.92  The Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit explained that the rationale for the rule was to 
prevent the appropriation of the subject matter as a whole to the 
holder of the copyright in the form in which the idea is 
expressed.93  For the same reason, the doctrine of scenes-à-faire 
prevents the copyrighting of the “incidents, characters or settings 
which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, 
in the treatment of a given topic.”94 
As Leslie Kurtz notes, “Character is a part of a work that is 
protected by copyright, but is not itself the subject of copyright.”95  
Thus, a character can receive copyright protection if it is 
sufficiently well delineated in a larger literary or artistic work.96  
 
 90 Id.; see also Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (explaining that copyright’s low bar to protection for creative 
works aligns with the public’s psychological preference for an artistic marketplace 
featuring a large number of new works of moderate originality rather than a more limited 
marketplace of highly innovative works). 
 91 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).  
 92 See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (“When 
the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that ‘the topic necessarily requires,’ 
if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting 
would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could 
exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.”) (citations omitted). 
 93 Id. at 679; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that “blank 
account-books are not the subject of copyright; and that the mere copyright . . . did not 
confer upon [the Plaintiff] the exclusive right to make and use account-books”). 
 94 Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(citing Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
 95 Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. 
REV. 429, 440. 
 96 See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that 
as a matter of law, the characters at issue in the defendant’s movie “Rocky” were 
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Of course, the flip side of this doctrine is that “the less developed 
the characters, the less they can be copyrighted.”97  In the 
landmark case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,98 Judge 
Learned Hand noted that copyright law cannot be limited to the 
text of a creative work, “else a plagiarist would escape by 
immaterial variations.”99  Instead, Judge Hand proposed comparing 
the two works through a “series of abstractions.”100  Later courts 
applying this language consider the work through such 
abstractions, filter out that expression which is unprotectable, and 
determine if a “reasonable observer could find [what remains] 
substantially similar beyond the level of generalized or otherwise 
nonprotectible ideas.”101  Substantial similarity is a necessarily 
amorphous concept.  As Judge Hand explained in Nichols, themes 
and broad ideas in plays and literature are not protected by the 
copyright in the work as these are no more than the author’s ideas.  
In Nichols, for example, Judge Hand considered a claim that the 
defendant’s movie The Cohens and The Kellys infringed the 
plaintiffs play Abie’s Irish Rose.102  Among other things, Judge 
Hand found that one pair of the plaintiff’s characters were little 
more than “low comedy” “stock figures” and another were “so 
faintly indicated as to be no more than stage properties.”103  
Accordingly, the Nichols court held, the plaintiff’s copyright in 
Abie’s Irish Rose did not protect these characters and the 
defendant’s use of similar characters did not infringe the plaintiff’s 
copyright.104 
The Second Circuit uses a two-part test for copyright 
infringement: “(a) that the defendant copied from the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work and (b) that the copying . . . went so far as to 
constitute improper appropriation.”105  The court has held that the 
 
“delineated so extensively that they [were] protected from bodily appropriation when 
taken as a group and transposed into a sequel by another author”). 
 97 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 98 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 99 Id. at 121. 
 100 Id.  
 101 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).  
102    Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120. 
103    Id. at 122. 
104    Id. 
 105    Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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evidence of copying could be proved either by “defendant’s 
admission” or “circumstantial evidence” of access.106  “A party can 
establish access either by demonstrating that (1) the infringed work 
has been widely disseminated or (2) a particular chain of events 
exists by which the alleged infringer might have gained access to 
the copyrighted work.”107  Where access to protectable expression 
is found, only substantial similarity between the original work and 
the allegedly copying work “will support a determination of 
infringement.”108 
Not every use of copyrighted material is an infringing use, 
however; fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright 
infringement.109  This defense protects use of copyrighted material 
for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
. . . scholarship, or research.”110  In analyzing whether a use is 
indeed fair, courts consider: 
 the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; 
 the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
 
 106 Id. 
107    Repp v. Webber, 947 F. Supp. 105, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted). 
 108 Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980); see also 4 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][a] 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010) (“The question in each case is whether the similarity 
relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of the plaintiff’s work—not whether 
such material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant’s work. . . .  The quantitative 
relation of the similar material to the total material contained in plaintiff’s work is 
certainly of importance.  However, even if the similar material is quantitatively small, if 
it is qualitatively important, the trier of fact may properly find substantial similarity. . . . 
[U]nder such circumstances the defendant may not claim immunity on the grounds the 
infringement ‘is such a little one.’  If, however, the similarity is only as to nonessential 
matters, then a finding of no substantial similarity should result.”). 
 109 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010). 
 110 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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 the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.111 
The maxim de minimis non curat lex—the law does not 
concern itself with trivialities—“applies to copyright actions no 
less than to other branches of law.”112  As used in copyright law, 
the doctrine means simply that “trivial copying is not an 
infringement.”113  As Judge Leval of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained: 
The de minimis doctrine is rarely discussed in 
copyright opinions because suits are rarely brought 
over trivial instances of copying.  Nonetheless, it is 
an important aspect of the law of copyright.  Trivial 
copying is a significant part of modern life. . . .  
Parents in Central Park photograph their children 
perched on José de Creeft’s Alice in Wonderland 
sculpture.  We record television programs aired 
while we are out, so as to watch them at a more 
convenient hour.  Waiters at a restaurant sing 
“Happy Birthday” at a patron’s table.  When we do 
such things, it is not that we are breaking the law 
but unlikely to be sued given the high cost of 
litigation.  Because of the de minimis doctrine, in 
trivial instances of copying, we are in fact not 
breaking the law.114 
However, while the doctrine permits “literal copying of a small 
and usually insignificant portion of the plaintiff’s work,”115 courts 
are careful to note that “even if a copied portion be relatively small 
in proportion to the entire work, if qualitatively important, the 
finder of fact may properly find substantial similarity.”116  
Unsurprisingly, then, when the subject of a copyright infringement 
 
 111 Id. § 107(1)–(4). 
 112 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01[G] 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010). 
 113 Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 116 CyberMedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(quoting Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
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action is a word or short phrase, this “qualitatively substantial” 
doctrine comes in conflict with the de minimis doctrine. 
The regulations and policies promulgated by the United States 
Copyright Office particularly affect words and short phrases such 
as those embodied in fictional trademarks like “Duff Beer.”  In 
1958, the Copyright Office issued a circular stating: 
To be entitled to copyright protection, a work must 
contain something capable of being copyrighted—
that is, an appreciable amount of original text or 
pictorial material. . . .  Brand names, trade names, 
slogans, and other short phrases or expressions 
cannot be copyrighted, even if they are distinctively 
arranged or printed.117 
The circular suggests that such phrases are better addressed 
under the laws of trademark and unfair competition.118  The 
following year, the Copyright Office enacted 37 C.F.R. § 202.1, 
refusing registration, inter alia, for “[w]ords and short phrases such 
as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere 
variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; 
mere listing of ingredients or contents.”119  This regulatory bar 
against copyright protection for words and short phrases “has 
historically been justified with copyright’s ‘originality’ 
requirement: A small expression is deemed to lack sufficient 
originality.”120 
 
 117 See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. 390 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 46, COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND 
LABELS (1958) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND LABELS]). The 
current version of this circular is CIRCULAR NO. 34, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION NOT 
AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT PHRASES (2009) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES OR SHORT PHRASES], available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf.  
 118 COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND LABELS, supra note 117. The current 
version of the Circular states, “Some brand names, trade names, slogans, and phrases 
may be entitled to protection under laws relating to unfair competition, or they may be 
entitled to protection and registration under the provisions of state or federal trademark 
laws. . . .  The Copyright Office has no role in these matters.” See COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT PHRASES, supra note 117. 
 119 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2010). 
 120 Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
575, 578 (2005). 
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Because copyright protection attaches automatically to a work 
as soon as it is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression,”121 
registration of the work with the Copyright Office is permissive 
and is not required for copyright protection to attach.122  However, 
because the copyright statute provides that “no civil action for 
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 
instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been 
made”123 with the Copyright Office, the filing of an application for 
registration is “a condition precedent for an infringement case to 
move forward in federal court.”124  Importantly, however, the 
statute does not require the registration to have actually been 
approved for an infringement suit to proceed.  The Copyright Act 
provides that 
where the deposit, application, and fee required for 
registration have been delivered to the Copyright 
Office in proper form and registration has been 
refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil 
action for infringement if notice thereof, with a 
copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of 
Copyrights.125 
Therefore, while the registration requirement may erect a speed 
bump in the path of an impending copyright litigation, and may 
even involve the Copyright Office intervening in the litigation and 
arguing as to its merits, the Copyright Office’s refusal to register a 
work cannot prevent even an unmeritorious infringement action 
from going to trial. 
 
 121 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 122 Id. § 408(a). 
 123 Id. § 411(a). 
 124 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16[B][1][a] 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010).  The Supreme Court recently classified 17 U.S.C. § 
411(a)’s registration requirement as a “claim-processing” rule, i.e., “a precondition to 
filing a claim that does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.” Reid 
Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010).  However, the Court declined to 
address whether “district courts may or should enforce [§ 411(a)’s registration 
requirement] sua sponte by dismissing copyright infringement claims involving 
unregistered works.” Id. at 1249. 
 125 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
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There is some disagreement among courts as to the role the de 
minimis doctrine and § 202.1 play in determining if a word or short 
phrase can ever be copyrightable.  In Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea 
Dumon, Inc.,126 the Seventh Circuit found that a phrase on the 
packaging of the plaintiff’s product, “the most personal sort of 
deodorant,” was not subject to copyright protection because it was 
“merely a short phrase or expression which hardly qualifies as an 
appreciable amount of original text.”127  The court further held that 
“to the extent that the phrase was connected with the artwork by 
different typography than the rest of the text, it is not protected 
because . . . mere distinctiveness in typographic ornamentation will 
not ordinarily qualify otherwise noncopyrightable material for 
copyright protection.”128  The Second Circuit took a similar 
approach in Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp.129 in 
1959, echoing the language of the 1958 Copyright Office circular: 
“[b]rand names, trade names, slogans, and other short phrases or 
expressions cannot be copyrighted, even if they are distinctively 
arranged or printed.”130  Taken together, these two cases appear to 
close the door to any copyright protection in a trademark. 
By contrast, several more recent cases appear to re-open the 
possibility of copyright in a single word or a short phrase.  For 
example, in Narell v. Freeman,131 Judge Farris characterized the 
title of a Frank Zappa song, “Weasels Ripped My Flesh” as an 
“original and hence protected phrase.”132  Similarly in Life Music, 
Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co.,133 the court stated in dicta that 
copyright protection might be available for the single invented 
word, “supercalifragilisticexpialidocious.”134  In Bird v. 
 
 126 466 F.2 705 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 127 Id. at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128 Id. 
 129 266 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 130 Id. at 544. 
 131 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 132 Id. at 911. 
 133 241 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
 134 Id. at 656 (“[E]ven if defendants copied only ‘the word’ 
[supercalifragilisticexpialidocious], they conceivably might still be liable for 
infringement.”); see also Tree Publ’g Co. v. Warner Bros. Records, 785 F. Supp. 1272, 
1275 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (citing Life Music approvingly and characterizing the word 
“supercalifragilisticexpialidocious” as “capriciously fanciful”). 
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Parsons,135 the Sixth Circuit noted that “copyright ordinarily does 
not subsist in a single word”136 and that in the case of “financia,” 
the plaintiff’s “claim that the word derives from another language 
suggests a lack of originality and creativity.”137  The court held that 
the “defendants’ alleged use of the word ‘efinancia’ [in its domain 
name] simply does not reproduce any of the creativity that entitles 
Bird to a copyright in the computer program titled Financia.”138  
Instead, the court held that because “the word derives from another 
language” it lacked “originality and creativity.”139 
In Cook v. Robbins,140 an unpublished opinion from the Ninth 
Circuit, the court went even further.  In that case, plaintiff Cook 
had written a book entitled “Wall Street Money Machine,” which 
shared strategies for investing in stocks which Cook had distilled 
from his experience as a cab driver.  Two of the book’s prominent 
themes were the idea of a “meter drop,” that is, Cook’s experience 
that “he could make more money taking numerous short trips than 
by waiting for higher fares,” and the concept of a “rolling stock”: a 
stock that “tends to consistently roll up to a specific price point and 
then drop down to a specific price point in an obvious pattern of 
repeated waves.”141  When Robbins used Cook’s phrases in his 
Financial Power seminar manual, Cook sued for copyright 
infringement.  At trial, the jury found for Cook and awarded 
$655,900 in damages but the district court granted judgment as a 
matter of law for the defendant because it found that “Cook failed 
to prove that any of [Robbins’] profits were attributable to phrases 
from [Cook’s] book.”142  Citing Feist, the Ninth Circuit reinstated 
the award holding that “Cook’s complete expressions in conveying 
the meaning of ‘meter drop’ and ‘rolling stock’ are creative, even 
 
 135 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 136 Id. at 881 (emphasis added). 
 137 Id. at 882; cf. Santrayll v. Burrell 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1052, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(finding that “the repetition of the non-protectible word ‘uh-oh’ in a distinctive rhythm 
comprises a sufficiently original composition to render it protectible by the copyright 
laws”). 
 138 Parsons, 289 F.3d at 881. 
 139 Id. at 882. 
 140 Nos. 98-36242, 99-35141, 14695 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.american-justice.org/upload/page/108/65/cook_v_robbins.pdf. 
 141 Id. at 14700. 
 142 Id. at 14699. 
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if only minimally so, and are protected by his copyright in Wall 
Street Money Machine.”143  The parties eventually settled, but not 
before the Copyright Office “proposed that the U.S. intervene to 
request rehearing en banc” out of concern that the holding “would 
undermine Rule 202.1.”144  The Ninth Circuit subsequently ordered 
the opinion unpublished.145  Unsurprisingly, Justin Hughes 
remarks that “it is hard to think of a better example of the 
qualitatively substantial doctrine than Cook v. Robbins.”146 
More recently, in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,147 the 
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a system of part numbers 
used by a manufacturer of screw fasteners was excluded from 
copyright protection because it was “not original”148 and for the 
independent reason that the numbers themselves were “analogous 
to short phrases or the titles of works.”149  Acting as amicus curiae, 
the United States submitted that the Register of Copyrights, relying 
on § 202.1, “routinely and categorically denies protection to all 
part numbers, no matter how creative.”150  Citing § 202.1 and the 
1958 Copyright Office circular, the majority held that “the 
Copyright Office’s longstanding practice of denying registration to 
short phrases merits deference.”151 
Judge Roth, joined by Judge Chertoff dissented, challenging 
the majority’s view of the conclusiveness of the de minimis 
doctrine and the regulation: “even if Southco’s part numbers were 
properly considered ‘short phrases,’ § 202.1 is best understood as a 
rough starting point for an originality analysis, not a shortcut for 
avoiding this analysis.”152  Noting that “[s]hort phrases are 
typically unprotectable because they are either insufficiently 
independent or insufficiently creative or both,” Judge Roth argued 
that “it does not make sense to state categorically that no 
 
 143 Id. at 14711. 
 144 Hughes, supra note 120, at 591. 
 145 Cook v. Robbins, 232 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 146 Hughes, supra note 120, at 589. 
 147 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 148 Id. at 282. 
 149 Id. at 285. 
 150 Id. at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151 Id. at 286. 
 152 Id. at 298 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
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combination of numbers or words short enough to be deemed a 
‘phrase’ can possess ‘at least some minimal degree of creativity’” 
as required by the Supreme Court under Feist.153  Therefore, she 
argued, “it would seem (notwithstanding [§ 202.1]) that even a 
short phrase may command copyright protection if it exhibits 
sufficient creativity.”154  This analysis was cited with approval by 
Judge Kane of the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado in 2009.155 
The next Part applies the two doctrines outlined above to the 
fictional trademark problem and highlights the strengths and 
weaknesses of proceeding under either doctrine. 
II. A TRADEMARK OR A COPYRIGHT INJURY? 
Fox and The Simpsons’ creator, Matt Groening, developed the 
idea for the fictional brand, Duff.  Therefore, when a real-world 
manufacturer puts out a product by the same name, one might 
think that it has stolen Fox’s idea and that, as a matter of equity, 
intellectual property law ought to furnish a remedy.  But 
intellectual property law does not protect ideas in the abstract.156  
While a real-world Duff manufacturer may have taken more than 
just an idea, it is difficult to articulate how much more.  Part of the 
reason it is so difficult to conceptualize the injury Fox suffers 
when another producer introduces a Duff Beer to the marketplace 
stems from the fact that Duff Beer is a fictional product sold in a 
fictional universe under a fictional brand name.  Fox’s injury looks 
very different when we suspend our disbelief and plunge into the 
 
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
2.01[B] (3d ed. 1994)). 
 155 See Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 
1226, 1238 (D. Colo. 2009) (“I am persuaded by Judge Roth that the Copyright Office’s 
regulation does not strip copyright protection from . . . original expressions [which are 
manifested in short phrases].”). 
 156 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing copyright protection for creative 
expression, but not the idea underlying that expression, as soon as the expression is fixed 
“in a tangible medium”), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (providing protection for functional matter 
which meets the requirements of novelty, utility, non-obviousness and other statutory 
criteria), and 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (providing protection for symbols used as designations of 
source in commerce). 
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fictional world of Springfield, accepting the fictional reality as our 
own and when we pull back, remind ourselves that The Simpsons is 
nothing more than a cartoon and view Duff Beer as one element of 
a vividly imagined work of animated fiction.  As a consequence of 
this puzzle of perspective, Fox suffers a different intellectual 
property injury depending on our vantage point. 
An analogy to Internet law helps explicate the puzzle.  Writing 
on the problem of perspective in this area of the law, Professor 
Orin Kerr posits that “whenever we apply law to the Internet, we 
must first decide whether to apply the law to the facts as seen from 
the viewpoint of physical reality or virtual reality.”157  Kerr terms 
the perspective from inside virtual reality the “‘internal 
perspective’ of the Internet” and the point of view of an “outsider 
concerned with the functioning of the network in the physical 
world rather than the perceptions of a user” the “external 
perspective.”158  In attempting to apply law to the Internet, our 
perception of who is doing what to whom is not a mere cognitive 
tool for conceptualizing difficult problems, Kerr contends.  
Instead, our selection of perspective is itself outcome 
determinative, because “[b]y choosing the perspective, we choose 
the reality; by choosing the reality, we choose the facts; and by 
choosing the facts, we choose the law.”159  While Kerr suggests 
that courts may dismiss this problem of perspective as “a minor 
skirmish in the ‘battle of analogies,’” he notes that courts “already 
choose perspectives when they apply law to the Internet” without 
realizing it.160 
The analogy to Internet law is not a perfect fit.  For one thing, 
while the Internet is interactive, such that users can participate in 
the virtual world, even creating and trading on their own marks 
within that world,161 Springfield is a closed universe: we can enjoy 
it only as it is presented to us by Fox.  Nevertheless, the fictional 
world of Springfield is, like the Internet, a vast virtual world.  We 
 
 157 Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 
(2003). 
 158 Id. at 359–60. 
 159 Id. at 361. 
 160 Id. at 381. 
 161 See infra Part III. 
C04_ARROW_011111_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2011  4:07 PM 
2010] FICTIONAL TRADEMARKS 139 
can understand it, as we can the Internet, from an internal 
perspective, wherein Duff Beer is real and dominates the 
marketplace or from the external perspective in which we are 
aware that Duff is a parody: a farcical wink at popular culture 
embedded in a work of pure fiction.  Kerr’s methodology is thus a 
good fit for the problem of fictional trademarks as well, because it 
provides an analytical framework for exploring how the ontology 
of a fictional mark, like our understanding of the “facts” of the 
Internet, changes depending on our perspective.  As with Internet 
law, by choosing the perspective, we choose to view Duff either as 
a real beer which has really been used in commerce, or as a 
colorful aspect of a fictional work which is used to entertain.  By 
choosing between these versions of reality, we choose the legal 
remedies available.  Thus, Kerr’s lens of perspective helps us 
identify two different versions of a story Fox can tell in court, and 
in turn, suggests the law to be applied. 
Viewing this problem from the internal perspective, that is, 
from the vantage point of a resident of Springfield, Fox can claim a 
trademark injury.  Having already used Duff Beer as a mark, it will 
argue, the breweries’ latter use of the mark as an indicator of 
source for beer is likely to lead to consumer confusion as to the 
origin of the beer.162  Fox can also bring an action for dilution, 
alleging that the breweries’ use of the name “Duff” weakens the 
distinctiveness of its famous mark even if it is not being used on 
beer.163  Proceeding under a dilution theory, Duff would not even 
have to make out a showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion. 
Fox could also view the situation from the external perspective.  
Seen this way, Duff Beer is a significant element of its literary 
property, The Simpsons.  Because the expression of a parodic beer 
with an unflattering name is minimally creative artistic expression 
fixed in the tangible medium of film, the breweries’ appropriation 
of Fox’s original expression might constitute a copyright injury.164 
Both of these theories accurately provide a way of 
conceptualizing the injury Fox suffers from the breweries’ actions, 
 
 162 See infra Part III. 
 163 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
 164 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
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yet both are doctrinally problematic.  While Duff Beer is itself a 
brand name (albeit a fictional one) Duff would have had to have 
used the mark in commerce to reserve rights in the mark.165  That 
being so, the court would have to find that Fox and Groening’s use 
of “Duff” within the fictional world of Springfield is sufficient to 
establish priority in the mark such that another’s use of that mark 
would constitute trademark infringement.  The copyright theory is 
troublesome as well.  While it is perhaps more intellectually honest 
to say that the only way Fox has really used the mark has been as 
part of the texture of its literary property, The Simpsons, copyright 
law’s de minimis doctrine may permit the use of the word “Duff” 
on beer and declines independent protection for words and short 
phrases such as “Duff Beer.”  Thus, if a copyist took Duff Beer 
and all of Homer Simpson with it, Fox could easily establish 
copyright infringement.  But if a copyist takes no more than the 
words “Duff Beer” and even the Duff label, it is difficult to argue 
that this expression is substantial enough to be protected by Fox’s 
copyright in The Simpsons.  This Part explores whether either 
doctrine can or should furnish fictional trademarks with real-life 
protection. 
A. The Trademark Theory of Fictional Trademarks 
Taking the internal perspective and assuming a traditional 
trademark infringement scenario, i.e., that Duff’s competitor is a 
junior user making a product called “Duff Beer” in Springfield, 
trademark law endows Duff with a full doctrinal arsenal. 
If Springfield were within the jurisdiction of American federal 
law, and a competitor of Duff manufactured and sold a rival 
product, also called Duff Beer, the original Duff would have an 
easy case.  The original Duff—the senior user—would merely 
have to prove that it had made bona fide use of the mark in 
commerce in connection with the sale of goods, and that “the 
defendant’s use of that mark is likely to cause [consumer] 
 
 165 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a); see also Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
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confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the 
defendant with the plaintiff” as a result.166 
Within the fictional world of Springfield, Duff has a strong, 
distinctive mark.167  It would be an understatement to say that Duff 
Brewery has used the mark in commerce as a designation of source 
in connection with the sale of beer.  Advancing to the likelihood of 
confusion analysis, a court would likely emphasize the strength of 
the mark (in the case of Duff, a strong, distinctive mark, made 
more so by Duff’s extensive advertising), proximity of the goods 
(both are beers) the similarity of the marks (the marks are 
identical) and perhaps most significantly, the defendant’s intent in 
selecting the mark (a court will almost certainly infer that the 
junior user’s use of “Duff” as a trademark for beer strongly 
indicates its intent to divert business from the senior user).  In this 
scenario, Duff would win handily. 
Even if a new market entrant were to manufacture Duff shoes, 
or Duff automobile parts, Duff would have an easy dilution case.  
Given its extensive market penetration, Duff would easily establish 
its fame and would be virtually certain to succeed on its claim that 
the junior user’s use of the mark would dilute Duff’s mark by 
blurring: that is, by weakening the mark’s uniqueness in the 
public’s eyes.168 
But take the junior user out of Springfield, into the real world, 
and all bets are off.  The major hurdle for Duff is priority.  Within 
Springfield, Duff easily meets this requirement by means of its use 
 
 166 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). 
 167 A court would almost certainly find the mark to be a suggestive mark (i.e., 
suggesting either that in sufficient quantities, it transforms the consumer into a lumbering 
clod or causes him to spend a significant amount of time on his rear end). See Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 455 (Austl.) (“It is 
fair to say that the beer and its consumption are not shown in a favourable light.”). 
 168 Because of trademark law’s balancing act vis-à-vis the First Amendment, however, 
a book or educational video about Duff Beer would be a permissible use of the mark.  
Similarly, Fudd, Duff’s rival from the fictional town of Shelbyville, is free to run an ad 
contending that “Fudd tastes better than Duff.” See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 
F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“These are uses that, though potentially dilutive, are 
nevertheless permitted: comparative advertising; news reporting and commentary; and 
noncommercial use.”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B)). 
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of the mark on its beer as well as on Duff Gardens and in 
associated advertising.  Here in the real world, however, it is much 
harder to establish that Duff and its creators Groening and Fox 
have actually used the mark in commerce such as to establish 
priority in the mark.  Indeed, as “[t]he use requirement rewards 
those who act quickly in getting new products in the hands of 
consumers,”169 courts may be more sympathetic to the Rodrigo 
Contrerases of the world who make diligent efforts to speed new 
products to market—particularly those for which there is ample 
demand. 
Courts considering these issues in two prominent fictional 
trademark cases found a real-life trademark injury for the 
appropriation of fictional trademarks.  This Note now considers 
both in turn. 
1. DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers 
In DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers,170 DC Comics sued Jerry 
Powers, the publisher of an “alternate culture” publication calling 
itself The Daily Planet—the same name as “the fictional 
Metropolis newspaper which employs Superman’s alter ego”171—
from DC’s Superman comic book series.  DC Comics sued Powers 
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.172  Powers moved for a 
preliminary injunction “to preclude [DC Comics] from any use of 
the name Daily Planet” and DC Comics cross-moved for injunctive 
relief “seeking to preclude [Powers] from any use of the Daily 
Planet.”173  While Powers had at one point registered the name The 
Daily Planet as a trademark for his newspaper, the newspaper 
folded in 1973 and the mark was cancelled by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office in 1976.174  Both DC Comics and 
Powers claimed exclusive rights to use of The Daily Planet, based 
 
 169 Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 170 465 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 171 Id. at 845. 
 172 Id.; see Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (“[F]alse designation of 
origin”).   
 173 Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 845–46. 
 174 Id. at 847. 
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on their prior use of the name.  As the court noted, however, what 
was “really at issue” was whether either party would be “entitled to 
exclusive exploitation of the name Daily Planet based on the 
expected wave of public interest in the Superman character 
calculated to result from the release of the Superman movie” that 
year.175 
The court began by analyzing the comparative use of the mark 
by both DC Comics and Powers.  Noting that The Daily Planet 
first appeared in the Superman story in 1940, the court emphasized 
that since that time, the fictional newspaper had “played a key role, 
not only in the development of the Superman story, but also in the 
development of the Superman character.”176  The court emphasized 
that DC had “gone to great effort and expense throughout the long 
history of Superman to utilize the Superman character in 
connection with a myriad of products born of the Superman 
story.”177  While the fictional paper “was never singled out” in any 
of DC’s many licensing agreements for use of the Superman 
characters, the court noted that it was “part and parcel of the 
typical licensing agreement” and that the fictional newspaper had 
been “prominently featured on many products emanating from 
these licensing agreements.”178  The court contrasted DC’s use of 
The Daily Planet with Powers’ use of the mark, which it 
characterized as “brief and, at best, sporadic.”179  Accordingly, the 
court found that “only [DC Comics] has demonstrated an 
association of such duration and consistency with the Daily Planet 
sufficient to establish a common law trademark therein” and noted 
that “the Daily Planet has over the years become inextricably 
woven into the fabric of the Superman story.”180 
In holding that plaintiff DC Comics had “demonstrated a 
probability of success on the merits sufficient to warrant” the grant 
of an injunction against Powers’ use of The Daily Planet, the court 
 
 175 Id. at 846. 
 176 Id. at 847. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id.  
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suggested two rationales underpinning its decision.181  It 
emphasized that “plaintiff has . . . engaged in extensive licensing 
of the Superman character as well as the Superman story covering 
a myriad of products” and “the Daily Planet has played a key role 
in many of these licensing agreements.”182  It also noted that “the 
Daily Planet has become so closely associated with the 
presentation of the Superman story that any use thereof by 
defendants would create a substantial likelihood of confusion at the 
consumer level.”183  The court concluded that it was thus “quite 
apparent that defendants, both in adopting the Daily Planet as the 
title of their newspaper and in its publication, intended to at least 
confuse, if not to deceive the public as to the origin of the 
publication.”184 
The licensing agreements certainly represent real-world uses in 
commerce and appear to have been central to the court’s finding 
that DC Comics possessed a common law trademark in The Daily 
Planet.  Further, while the court leans heavily on DC’s use of the 
fictional paper to advance the Superman story, it is unclear if it 
would have concluded that use of The Daily Planet in the story, 
without more, was sufficient to support a finding of the existence 
of a trademark. 
2. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v South Australian 
Brewing Co. 
In a 1996 Australian case, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v 
South Australian Brewing Co.,185 Fox and The Simpsons’ creator, 
Matt Groening (“the producers”), brought suit against South 
Australian Brewing Co. and Lion Nathan Australia (“the 
breweries”) seeking to enjoin them “from promoting or dealing 
with any product in the form of a can . . . with the wording, get-
up186 and name” of the fictional Duff Beer.187  The plaintiffs 
 
 181 Id. at 848. 
 182 Id.  
 183 Id. at 848–49 (emphasis added). 
 184 Id. at 849. 
185  [1996] 66 FCR 451 (Austl.). 
 186 Also known as trade dress. 
 187 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 453 
(Austl.). 
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proceeded on two causes of action.  The first alleged breach of 
section 52 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 under Australian 
law.188  While the Act does not mention the use of marks or 
symbols at all, its language and policy rationale (i.e., consumer 
protection) suggest that it is best construed as the Australian 
analogue of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.189  The producers 
also brought a cause of action for “passing off”190—that is, for 
attempting to pass off the breweries’ goods as originating with the 
producers—a common law tort in Australia, which is also 
subsumed under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in American 
law.191 
 
 188 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52 (Austl.).  Entitled “Misleading or deceptive 
conduct,” this provision states that “a corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage 
in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.”  The 
provision is located under “Part V—Consumer Protection.” 
 189 Compare Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52 (Austl.) (“[A] corporation shall not, 
in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to 
mislead or deceive”) with Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006): 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, 
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 
or misleading representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a 
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to 
be damaged by such act. 
 190 S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 452. 
 191 Id. at 472 (“[F]ive characteristics . . . must be present . . . to create a valid cause of 
action for passing off: (1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, 
(3) to respective customers . . . or ultimate consumers of goods supplied by him, (4) 
which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader . . . and (5) which 
causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is 
brought . . . .”); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 
28 n.1 (2003) (“Passing off (or palming off as it is sometimes called) occurs when a 
producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s.  ‘Reverse passing 
off,’ as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else’s 
goods or services as his own.”).  The Court noted that this conduct violates § 43 of the 
Lanham Act. Id. at 30. 
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The court began by noting that the name “Duff” was conceived 
by Groening “as the name of an imaginary beer which would be 
associated particularly with ‘Homer’ and also with his ‘bar-fly’ 
friends and associates” and that the beer “is assigned an important 
role in the series viewed as a whole.”192  The court noted that Fox 
had licensed clothing manufacturers in Australia to produce caps 
and T-shirts193 and had also released comic books featuring the 
fictional beer194 but has “consistently refused to grant licenses to 
parties who have sought to use ‘The Simpsons’ in connection with 
alcohol and tobacco products, or other substances considered 
detrimental to children.”195  The court also noted that “[t]he 
evidence clearly establishes that throughout the series there is a 
clear and pervasive association of ‘Duff Beer’ with ‘Homer’ and 
other characters such as ‘Barney,’ his friend”196 and emphasized 
the show’s “wide coverage, deep market penetration, and broad 
recognition”197 resulting in “substantial goodwill and reputation in 
Australia in relation to the characters, names and images appearing 
in ‘The Simpsons’ including the name ‘Duff Beer.’”198 
The court found that the name “Duff” had “acquired a powerful 
secondary meaning” when used in relation to the fictional beer.199  
Indeed, in its view, “it would be artificial in the extreme to suggest 
that consumers would be attracted by the concept of ‘Duff’ on the 
basis of its dictionary meaning . . . [the] key attractive features 
arise from the association with ‘The Simpsons’ and not from any 
literal dictionary meaning of the word ‘duff.’”200 
Importantly, the court noted: 
 
 192 S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 455 (“There is one whole episode substantially 
devoted to the theme of ‘Duff Beer’ (Duffless) and the name ‘Duff’ features prominently 
and repeatedly in another 22-minute episode, ‘Selma’s Choice’”). 
 193 Id. at 455–56. 
 194 Id. at 456 (noting that “[t]he merchandise contains references to copyright and to the 
reserved rights of Groening or Twentieth Century Fox”).  
 195 Id. at 457. 
 196 Id. at 458. 
197  Id. at 455. 
 198 Id. at 456. 
 199 Id. at 465. 
 200 Id.  
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An unusual aspect of this case, is that it concerns 
not a fictional ‘character’ as such, but a ‘make-
believe’ product, namely the fictional ‘Duff Beer’ 
which is coupled with a character, a background 
institution, (Duff Brewery), and also with the 
associated advertising signs, posters and images of 
the beer, which play an important role in the series.  
These features form part of the fictional 
‘environment’ in which the stories are played out.  
It plays a background role as part of the fictional 
world which the characters inhabit.201 
The court concluded that “the principles which apply to 
character image or title association are equally applicable to the 
name of a product which features in the program, in this instance, 
‘Duff Beer.’”202  That being so, the court held that “the deliberate 
creation by the breweries of an association by use of the name 
‘Duff’ between the breweries’ beer can with ‘The Simpsons” 
program, in circumstances where there is no association and 
indeed, where such association is contrary to the express policy of 
the producers, amounts to misleading and deceptive conduct.”203  
The court found that the producers had successfully made out the 
elements of passing off as well.204 
In both Powers and South Australian, the courts seem to 
embrace the principle articulated in DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation 
 
 201 Id. at 465–66. 
 202 Id. at 466. 
 203 Id. at 470.  Although letters from the breweries to vendors made a “tongue-in-
cheek” attempt at disassociation from The Simpsons (“Oh and (to be serious for a 
moment) yes we’re aware of the fact that another ‘Duff Beer’ features in ‘The Simpson’s’ 
[sic] TV show.  Please note Homer’s favourite drop is a completely separate, fictitious 
product.  We would encourage you not to use ‘Simpson’s’ [sic] imagery or logos in 
supporting ‘Duff Beer’ as these are not owned by us and in doing so you may run the risk 
of infringing legal copyright.”), the court found “a notable lack of any attempt to drive 
this message home to the ‘consuming public.’” Id. at 471. 
 204 Id. at 472 (“There has been a misrepresentation as to the association of the goods 
with ‘The Simpsons,’ made by [the] breweries in the course of trade, to prospective 
customers or ultimate consumers.  It is reasonably foreseeable that the business or 
goodwill of ‘The Simpsons’ and their licensing and merchandising rights could be 
adversely affected, particularly in the light of the policy in relation to alcohol 
promotion.”). 
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Associates that a significant ingredient of an entertainment work 
can come to stand for the work in the public mind, and in so doing, 
becomes a trademark.205  In Powers, the court emphasized the role 
The Daily Planet played “not only in the Superman story, but also 
in the development of the Superman character.”206  Indeed, the 
court held that any use of the mark by the defendants would 
“create a substantial likelihood of confusion at the consumer 
level,”207 precisely “because the Daily Planet has become so 
closely associated with the presentation of the Superman story.”208  
Similarly, in South Australian, the court employed Filmation-type 
reasoning in emphasizing the “important role” the “‘make-believe’ 
product” Duff Beer plays on The Simpsons.209 
Indeed, the courts in Powers and South Australian note the 
efforts of the plaintiffs in those cases to actively forge an 
association between the fictional mark and the entertainment 
franchise.  The Powers court does this in two oblique ways.  First, 
it states that the “plaintiff has gone to great effort and expense 
throughout the long history of Superman to utilize the Superman 
character in connection with a myriad of products born of the 
Superman story.”210  It then describes DC’s efforts to license and 
merchandise Superman and notes that the “typical licensing 
agreement would permit use not only of Superman, but of all the 
Superman characters” and that The Daily Planet “has been 
prominently featured on many products emanating from these 
licensing agreements.”211  Without expressly so stating, the court 
essentially reasoned that DC’s licensing of The Daily Planet on 
merchandise represented its attempts to forge a link in the public 
 
205  486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see supra notes 51–53 and accompanying 
text. 
 206 DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers, 465 F. Supp. 843, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 207 Id. at 848–49. 
 208 Id. at 848 (emphasis added). 
 209 S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 465–66.  The court’s conclusion that consumers 
would actually be turned off by a product called “Duff” but for its association with The 
Simpsons further strengthens the inference that a Filmation-type rationale undergirds the 
reasoning in South Australian Brewing Co. Id.  
 210 Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 847. 
 211 Id. 
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mind between the fictional trademark, The Daily Planet and DC’s 
entertainment product, Superman. 
Second, the Powers court notes that “the Daily Planet has 
become so closely associated with the presentation of the 
Superman story that any use thereof by defendants would create a 
substantial likelihood of confusion . . . .”212  Though buried in the 
passive voice, the Powers court seems to be saying that any use of 
The Daily Planet by the defendants would create a substantial 
likelihood of confusion because DC Comics had already succeeded 
in linking that name to the Superman franchise.  By contrast, the 
court in South Australian appears implicitly to accept that the 
producers of The Simpsons had made efforts to link Duff Beer to 
the show when it notes with disapproval that “there is no 
disclaimer to consumers on the [breweries’ Duff Beer] can, or in 
the retail advertising or promotional material, to the effect that the 
beer is not that referred to in ‘The Simpsons’ program.”213 
B. The Copyright Theory of Fictional Trademarks 
Although decided under trademark law, much of the reasoning 
of the courts in Powers and South Australian seems to sound in 
copyright rather than trademark.  Indeed, because of the facts of 
those two cases, Fox and DC Comics could have brought 
supplemental copyright claims as well (although neither did).214 
In Powers, the court found “substantial evidence indicating that 
the adoption by defendants of the name Daily Planet in 1969 was 
merely an attempt to cash in on the Superman story and its 
notoriety.”215  The court noted “numerous references in the paper 
not only to the Superman character, but also to the Superman 
story,” including “[a] lead article entitled ‘Superman smokes super 
dope,’” “[u]se of the phrase ‘Watchdog of Metropolis’ as its 
slogan,” “[n]umerous drawings of the Superman character,” and 
the “[u]se of a masthead which was an exact replica of the Daily 
 
 212 Id. at 848. 
 213 S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 470–71 (emphasis added). 
 214 See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. 
Ga. 1984) (noting that defendant’s infringing use of the “Superman” character was 
significant enough that plaintiff could bring viable trademark and copyright claims). 
 215 Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 849. 
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Planet insignia appearing in numerous Superman comic books.”216  
Here, the court appears troubled by Powers’ unauthorized use of 
DC’s artistic expression in its own right.  This aspect of the court’s 
reasoning sounds overwhelmingly in copyright, and indeed, may 
have been enough to support an independent copyright action. 
Similarly in South Australian, the court notes that “‘Duff Beer’ 
appears in nearly all episodes of [The Simpsons] broadcast in 
Australia . . . with varying degrees of prominence” including “one 
whole episode substantially devoted to the theme of ‘Duff Beer’ 
(Duffless) . . . and . . . another 22-minute episode, ‘Selma’s 
Choice.’”217  Here, the Court’s language suggests that it sees Duff 
Beer functioning like a fictional character which is sufficiently 
well delineated to receive copyright protection, or is, at a 
minimum, a substantial enough expressive element of the 
Simpsons story that it would not be filtered away during an 
abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis.218  Moreover, the South 
Australian court noted that Duff’s strong identity, its extensive 
fictional marketing, and its tether to Homer Simpson “form part of 
the fictional ‘environment’ in which the stories are played out.  It 
plays a background role as part of the fictional world which the 
characters inhabit.”219  Here, the court appears to view Duff as a 
protectable element of Fox’s literary property and a defining 
feature of a fictional world.  This reasoning, too, sounds strongly in 
copyright. 
In some fictional trademark cases, such as Powers, the 
defendant will have taken enough of the plaintiff’s protectable 
expression that the plaintiff can bring a traditional copyright claim.  
In such a case, the fictional mark will likely get swept up in the 
court’s larger infringement analysis, receiving at most a passing 
mention.  When such an appreciable amount of original expression 
is at issue, a court need not reach the issue of the copyrightability 
 
 216 Id.  
 217 S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 455. 
 218 See id. at 466 (“No doubt, the assignation of the name ‘Duff’ to the product was 
designed to achieve a more believable specific fictional effect than to have an anonymous 
generic ‘beer’ can and it serves to endow the characters with more focused identifiable 
‘human’ traits.”). 
 219 Id. at 466. 
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of the name and appearance of the fictional trademark itself; it 
need only determine whether the copyright in the larger 
entertainment work in which the mark is embedded has been 
infringed.  But the smaller the quantity of expression in dispute, 
the more qualitative weight the fictional mark itself must bear and 
the dicier the copyright analysis becomes. 
For example, it is not at all clear what an American court 
would do with the facts of the South Australian case had the 
plaintiffs proceeded on a copyright infringement theory (and 
brought the case in a United States district court).  Determining 
whether the breweries’ use of Duff Beer infringes Fox’s copyright 
in The Simpsons or is a mere de minimis use requires the court to 
analyze the role played by Duff Beer on The Simpsons.  Because 
no court has ever passed on a fictional trademark case brought on a 
copyright infringement theory, it is difficult to know how a court 
would rule.  Nevertheless, certain dicta in the opinion of the South 
Australian court’s opinion offer some clues.  The South Australian 
court found that the fictional beer plays “an important role in the 
series” and “form[s] part of the fictional ‘environment’” of 
Springfield.220  Seen this way, Fox’s copyright in The Simpsons 
extends to “Duff Beer” because the fictional product is a 
significant and well-defined creative element of the plot of The 
Simpsons just as Homer, Moe and Barney are.  The breweries’ use 
of the name “Duff Beer” thus constitutes copyright infringement 
(just as a drawing of Homer on the can surely would).  Treating 
well-defined fictional trademarks as something akin to protectable 
fictional characters is easily justified under the minimal creativity 
standard of Feist as well as the federal courts’ filtration test 
jurisprudence.221  Moreover, the fact that the breweries’ use was 
commercial strongly cuts against a finding of fair use.222 
 
 220 Id. at 465–66. 
 221 See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (finding 
that the characters in defendant Stallone’s “Rocky” films were “so highly delineated that 
they warrant copyright protection as a matter of law”). 
 222 See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“The 
fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that 
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.  Every commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to 
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Although copyright doctrine easily accommodates the above 
approach, a court may nevertheless view the fictional Duff as mere 
scenes-à-faire.  On this reading, Duff Beer is a generic low-
comedy trope—the cheap beer—akin to the unprotectable 
characters in Abie’s Irish Rose223 and accordingly unprotected by 
Fox’s copyright in The Simpsons.  Alternatively, the court could 
find that while Duff Beer is sufficiently creative to be protected by 
Fox’s copyright in The Simpsons, the breweries’ use of the name 
“Duff Beer” alone constitutes de minimis copying, particularly in 
light of their alteration of the appearance of the fictional can.224  In 
fact, courts may have an incentive to view the problem this way.  It 
is the stated policy of the Copyright Office to direct those seeking 
protection for “words, phrases, symbols or designs that distinguish 
the goods or services of one party from those of another” to the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and by implication, to 
trademark law.225  This policy is likely to exert subtle pressure on 
courts to find the breweries’ use of the Duff Beer name to be a de 
minimis use of copyrighted material, but potentially cognizable 
trademark infringement, and to channel the problem to trademark 
law. 
To proceed on its copyright infringement theory, Fox would 
then have to argue that the two words “Duff Beer” are themselves 
sufficiently creative that they should be entitled to independent 
copyright protection.  Forced to fend for itself as an independent 
res, Duff Beer almost certainly loses on § 202.1 grounds.  While 
the imprimatur of the Copyright Office is not required for a 
copyright action to proceed, it is clear that the agency’s views on 
copyrightability hold sway with the federal courts.  Indeed, while 
the Southco majority noted a split of opinion among the federal 
 
the owner of the copyright.” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))).   
 223 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 224 S. Austl. Brewing Co., 66 FCR at 471 (“The steps which are said to have been taken 
to disassociate [the breweries’ beer from the Duff Beer on] ‘The Simpsons’ . . .  include 
ensuring that the words ‘The Simpsons’ were not referred to on the can and the design, 
colour and get-up of the yellow can was said to be quite different from that featured in 
‘The Simpsons.’  Nor did the image of any ‘Simpsons’ character appear on the can.”). 
 225 See COPYRIGHT PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT 
PHRASES, supra note 117. 
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courts regarding the level of deference owed to the Copyright 
Office as a matter of administrative law, it reasoned that “[a]t a 
minimum, the practice of the Copyright Office reflects a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance.”226  Moreover, as Professor 
Hughes notes, “[a]lthough the [§ 202.1] bar exists only in the 
regulations of the Copyright Office, courts have applied this rule 
against claims of copyright” consisting of names and titles of 
various creative works.227 
In justifying the denial of copyright for Duff, however, the 
court may go one step too far and turn back the claim of copyright 
in “Duff Beer” on the reasoning that the fictional mark does not 
manifest the minimum creativity required by Feist.  Indeed, as 
Justin Hughes points out, the de minimis doctrine is classically 
justified by copyright’s originality doctrine.228  On this theory, “too 
short equals not creative equals not copyrightable.”229  Such 
reasoning is specious on its face.  Judge Roth pointedly observed 
that “it does not make sense to state categorically that no 
combination of numbers or words short enough to be deemed a 
‘phrase’ can possess ‘at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.’”230  Professor Hughes is even more direct: “it is 
fundamentally disingenuous to use the originality requirement as 
the doctrinal bar against copyright protection of titles, names and 
short phrases” because “[m]any very small expressions positively 
leap over the low threshold of originality we have established in 
copyright law.”231  Indeed, in Southco, the government essentially 
conceded as much in its brief: “we note that the Copyright Office 
will not register even a creative short phrase.”232  The troubling 
 
 226 Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 227 Hughes, supra note 120, at 581. 
 228 Id. at 578. 
 229 Id. at 605. 
 230 Southco, 390 F.3d at 286 (Roth, J., dissenting) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)). 
 231 Hughes, supra note 120, at 578. 
 232 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 15 Southco, Inc. v. 
Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-1243) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201034.pdf.   
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tendency of courts to press Feist into service to justify the de 
minimis bar calls into question the rationale for denying 
independent copyright protection to words, symbols and short 
phrases. 
If lack of creativity is a spurious justification for the de minimis 
doctrine, might there still be a workable policy justification for a 
de minimis doctrine in copyright law?  Hughes himself poses the 
best justification for the de minimis doctrine, arguing for a 
minimum-size requirement in copyright on the basis of preserving 
the balance of the overall doctrinal and statutory scheme of 
copyright.233  For example, Hughes notes, the third factor in the 
statutory fair use defense, “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole” is of 
course “directly sensitive to the size of the work.”234  Further, 
because courts often favor a finding of fair use where the second 
use is “transformative,” that is, a use which recontextualizes the 
borrowed material rather than merely appropriating it, Hughes 
argues that the smaller the work, the less likely a second use is to 
be transformative.235  There is, thus, a legitimate concern that a 
proliferation of such “microworks” would swallow the fair use 
defense.236  Further, Hughes points out, copyright law is intended 
to protect literary “compositions.”237  On this rationale, American 
and English courts have rejected protection for the label on a bottle 
of scotch238 and in the invented word “Exxon”239 among other 
things. 
 
 233 Hughes, supra note 120, at 578 (“The real issue is not lack of originality; the real 
issue is size.”). 
 234 Id. at 629 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)).   
 235 Id. at 629. 
 236 Id. at 578, 619. 
 237 Id. at 628–33. 
 238 Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) (concluding that “[t]o be entitled to a 
copyright the article must have by itself some value as a composition, at least to the 
extent of serving some purpose other than as a mere advertisement or designation of the 
subject to which it is attached”). 
 239 Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consultants Int’l, Ltd., [1981] 2 All E.R. 495, aff’d 
[1982] Ch. 119 (A.C.) (Eng.) (“I would have thought . . . that unless there is something in 
the context of the [copyright] Act which forbids it, a literary work would be something 
which was intended to afford either information and instruction, or pleasure in the form 
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Finally, there is the concern for what Hughes calls the “Oscar 
Wilde Principle”: a concern with removing “[m]uch of the world 
of witticisms, pithy observations, and insightful judgments” from 
the public domain.240  As Judge Roth conceded in her Southco 
dissent, “[i]t may well be that short expressions must hurdle a 
slightly higher creativity bar than longer works” so that “mundane 
phrases or slight variations on common expressions” will not be 
“taken out of the public domain.”241  This concern overlaps with 
the merger doctrine’s directive not to permit a party to appropriate 
a given body of subject matter by copyrighting the few forms that 
that subject matter might take.242  But it goes further and implicates 
the constitutional balance between the First Amendment and the 
Intellectual Property Clause.  While the latter secures “for limited 
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings,”243 the length of that limited time has grown 
considerably: from twenty-eight years, (renewable for another 
twenty-eight years) under the 1909 act, to forty-seven years 
(renewable for another twenty years) under the 1976 act, to a total 
of ninety-five years under the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act.244  For works created after 1976, copyright 
protection lasts even longer.245  With “limited times” becoming 
substantially less so, a court should indeed be particularly 
circumspect before removing a quip or other short phrase from the 
public domain for what is likely to be a century or more. 
Thus, whether “Duff Beer” is sufficiently creative to warrant 
independent copyright protection is probably the wrong question; 
Duff almost certainly is.  But at bottom, the question of whether or 
 
of literary entertainment. . . .  I am not sure whether [Exxon] can be said to be a ‘work’ at 
all; I am clearly of the opinion that it cannot be said to be a ‘literary work.’”). 
 240 Hughes, supra note 120, at 612.  
 241 Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 300 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(Roth, J., dissenting). 
 242 Id. at 293 n.11. 
 243 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 244 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 9:08 (Matthew 
Bender rev. ed. 2010). 
 245 Under the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, copyright protection 
“endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s 
death,” or for posthumous works, 95 years from the year of first publication or 120 years 
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
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not independent copyright protection should attach to a fictional 
trademark such as Duff has more to do with copyright’s overall 
doctrinal scheme and purpose than with the level of creativity of 
the fictional brand.  Particularly in a case like South Australian, 
then, where the defendant did not take any of the artwork 
associated with the fictional can, it may be correct to say that the 
plaintiff has not suffered a copyright injury.  Copyright protection 
is doubtless appropriate in cases such as Powers where significant 
visual or literary expression has been appropriated together with a 
fictional mark.  But to extend copyright protection to a logo, 
standing alone, no matter how creative, may simply place too 
much of a strain on copyright’s purpose and throw off the delicate 
balance struck by this body of intellectual property law. 
III. DOCTRINAL SOLUTION: TAILORING THE TRADEMARK ANALYSIS 
TO THE FICTIONAL TRADEMARK PROBLEM 
A real-life logo which may fall short of the originality required 
for copyright—some colors and a word or two, for instance—will 
often possess the requisite distinctiveness for trademark protection 
to attach, and will certainly do so where the name bears a non-
descriptive relationship to the product.  As a legal matter, then, 
trademark law is better equipped than copyright to provide 
protection for such logos.  But, this Note argues, trademark law is 
also superior to copyright law for the protection of fictional 
trademarks as an analytical matter. 
If instead of brewing Duff Beer, for example, Rodrigo 
Contreras were preparing derivative works—that is, producing new 
Simpsons episodes and selling those—Fox’s injury would indeed 
sound predominantly in copyright (although Fox almost certainly 
has trademarks in Homer, Moe and company).  In this scenario, 
Fox is really complaining of the appropriation of its literary 
property and its creative visual art.  However, the injury Fox 
suffers when another company manufactures the fictional beer 
from its show is that people think The Simpsons has something to 
do with the beer.  The breweries’ actions thus “cause confusion,” 
“mistake,” or “deceive as to the affiliation, connection or 
association . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval” of the 
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beer.246  They create confusion in the marketplace.  The breweries 
use the wealth of brand information packed into a symbol to 
deceive and they trade on the good will accumulated by another 
producer of a very different product.  Duff Beer, then, acts as a 
very distinctive trademark, but not a trademark for beer.  In 
appropriating the Duff Beer mark, the breweries trade on the good 
will The Simpsons has carefully built up in its entertainment 
franchise and signal to consumers that the beer contains the same 
experiential qualities as or bears the endorsement of that 
entertainment product.247  In so doing, the breweries “reap the 
financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable 
product.”248  Just not their product.  In this way, the appropriation 
of a fictional trademark leads to a real-world trademark injury. 
Nevertheless, there remains the problem of determining how 
(or if) Fox has reserved priority in the Duff Beer mark.  Here, this 
Note endorses an approach similar to that of the court in Filmation, 
which found that the prominent use of an ingredient of a fictional 
work (in that case, a fictional character) led to that ingredient’s 
coming to “symbolize the plaintiff in the public mind” here in the 
real world.249  The courts in both Powers and South Australian 
likewise appear to hold that at some point, a use in fiction rises to 
the level of a real-world use in commerce.  But at what point is a 
use in fiction sufficient to break the fictional mark through the 
fourth wall and into our world? 
In answering this question, an analogy to virtual worlds is 
instructive.  In online games such as Second Life, players 
experience a virtual community through their avatars.250  They can 
purchase any number of goods in this community with virtual 
“Linden Dollars,” which can be purchased with real dollars.  A 
number of goods which can be purchased in Second Life are 
simply virtual versions of real-world goods: Nike sneakers and the 
 
 246 Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 247 See, e.g., DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“Kryptonite . . . serves to identify the entertainment and other goods and services 
created, distributed and/or licensed by or on behalf of DC Comics.”) (emphasis added). 
 248 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
 249 DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 250 SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
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like.  But some goods are created expressly for Second Life and 
sold only in the game.  The appropriation of such goods by other 
virtual vendors has lead to real-life litigation resulting in several 
cases of real-life protection for these virtual trademarks.251 
Writing on the use of trademarks in these virtual worlds, 
Professors Candidus Dougherty and Greg Lastowka analyze the 
issue of whether a use in this world is a use in ours.252  Because 
“[m]any Second Life users are playing for real money profit,”253 
they argue, “a Second Life user who regularly conducts in-world 
sales under a recognized brand should meet the use threshold 
required to establish trademark rights.”254  However, they exclude 
“a hobby-use, a de minimis use . . . a handful of sales or an internal 
business use” from the list of uses sufficient to establish trademark 
rights.255 
Fictional trademarks are a closer case.  Like a virtual trademark 
in Second Life, Duff Beer is a fictional mark being used in a 
virtual world.  Unlike the virtual world of Second Life, however, 
Springfield is non-interactive and the individual elements of that 
world are not separately monetized.  Thus, unlike in Second Life, 
where the number of sales generated and the revenue earned by the 
creator of a virtual trademark are easily calculated, it is unclear to 
what extent the creators of The Simpsons owe their financial 
success to Duff.  Thus, the conventional use in commerce 
analysis—scrutinizing The Simpsons’ overall sales or ratings—
does not provide the full picture of Fox’s use of Duff, specifically. 
 
 251 See, e.g., Eros LLC v. Leatherwood, No. 8:07-CV-01158-SCB-TEW (M.D. Fla. 
filed July 3, 2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/ 
2008-03-20-Order%20for%20Judgment%20by%20Consent.pdf (enjoining defendant 
from selling unauthorized copies of “sex bed” for use in Second Life); Eros LLC v. 
Simon, No. 1:07-cv-04447-SLT-JMA (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2008-01-03-Judgment%20by%20 
Consent%20as%20to%20Simon.pdf (settlement for unauthorized copying of virtual sex 
toys for use in Second Life). 
 252 Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 749 (2008). 
 253 Id. at 779. 
 254 Id. at 782. 
 255 Id. 
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In the fictional trademark context, then, this Note proposes that 
courts more broadly analyze the efforts expended by the creator of 
a fictional mark to link the mark and the associated entertainment 
product in the public mind.256  Certainly the market penetration 
and popularity of the larger entertainment work—elements 
measured by the conventional use in commerce analysis—provide 
circumstantial evidence of the efforts of the mark’s creator to forge 
an association.  Indeed, these indicia constitute essential factors in 
calculating use and represent an important limiting principle.  This 
is so because the author of a fictional work will seldom register a 
fictional mark, and indeed, will likely not be permitted to do so by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office absent immediate 
plans to use the mark in commerce, such as by licensing it.257  
Accordingly, to function as a real-world mark, a fictional 
trademark must be associated with an entertainment work which 
has achieved “substantial sales.”258  The Kryptonite court seems to 
have assumed this when it noted with approval that the fictional 
element Kryptonite had “come to be recognized as a powerful 
symbol” for the Superman franchise, “[a]s a result of broad 
dissemination throughout all media.”259  Conversely, minimal 
distribution of the entertainment work in which the fictional mark 
is embedded (what this Note will call the “container entertainment 
work”) might implicate the Zazu court’s concern that rival firms 
 
 256 Importantly, the fictional trademark plaintiff’s efforts in this regard operate in 
precisely the same way as do those of a conventional trademark plaintiff seeking to forge 
an association between her product and her trade symbol.  Indeed, the conventional use in 
commerce analysis is essentially a proxy for the more difficult task of assaying 
consumers’ associations. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  Thus, calculating 
use in commerce by measuring the fictional trademark proprietor’s attempts to link the 
mark and the associated entertainment work poses a new analytical model, but breaks no 
legal ground. See DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff DC Comics’ use of the prominent 
fictional element “Kryptonite” in DC’s Superman comic books, motion pictures and 
television programs amounted to use only as a story element or character and not as a 
“trademark use” protectable under the Lanham Act). 
257    See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 258 Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 259 Kryptonite, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 332. 
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receive fair notice that a mark is already associated with a 
competitor’s brand.260 
To complete the picture of whether a plaintiff has made 
substantial efforts to link the fictional mark and the container 
entertainment work in the public mind, the prominence of the 
fictional mark within the work must also be measured.  Here, 
courts should apply copyright’s filtration test to determine if the 
mark is a sufficiently prominent and well-defined element of the 
fictional atmosphere, or mere scenes-à-faire.  The proposed 
trademark priority analysis is thus both quantitative and 
qualitative.   A mark must be sufficiently pervasive throughout the 
container entertainment work that it could reasonably come to 
stand for the work in the public mind.  By measuring sales of the 
container entertainment work and the pervasiveness of the mark 
within that work together, this quantitative analysis serves as a 
proxy for the quantitative “active use” in commerce inquiry 
performed at the priority step under the conventional trademark 
analysis.261  Unlike in the conventional use in commerce inquiry, 
however, a fictional mark must also have achieved some minimal 
level of literary distinctiveness (the “slight amount” of creativity 
required by the Supreme Court in Feist) as to be capable of 
becoming uniquely associated with the container entertainment 
work.  The distinctiveness inquiry at the priority step is not a 
substitute for the more fine-grained analysis the court will perform 
at the likelihood of confusion stage; at the priority step, the court 
does not evaluate the strength of the mark and does not assess 
actual confusion.  Rather, by examining whether the fictional mark 
is potentially memorable enough to serve as shorthand for the 
entertainment work, this prong of the test simply ensures that the 
fictional trademark proprietor was the first to use the mark as a 
mark. 
Courts should also note whether the mark appears in licensing 
agreements: either as a real-world manifestation of its fictional 
 
 260 Zazu, 979 F.2d at 503 (“By insisting that firms use marks to obtain rights in them, 
the law prevents entrepreneurs from reserving brand names in order to make their rivals’ 
marketing more costly.  Public sales let others know that they should not invest resources 
to develop a mark similar to one already used in the trade.”). 
261  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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existence or simply depicted on T-shirts, etc.  While licensing 
agreements were present in both Powers and South Australian, 
their existence should function as a one-way ratchet.  That is, the 
presence of a licensing agreement involving the fictional mark 
should be strong prima facie evidence of a plaintiff’s efforts to 
reserve priority in the mark, but the absence of such an agreement, 
standing alone, should not be viewed as outcome determinative.  
Additionally, courts should determine whether the fictional mark 
appears in any advertising such as promotions for the 
entertainment work on television or movie posters or in derivative 
works such as The Simpsons comic book series. 
The court should then proceed to the traditional multi-factor 
“likelihood of confusion” analysis.  Most courts’ first factor, 
strength of the mark, poses difficulties in the fictional trademark 
context because while “Bass” is distinctive on shoes, for example, 
but “leather” is not, nearly anything will seem fanciful when used 
on an entertainment product.  Courts should thus evaluate the 
distinctiveness of a fictional mark by again using copyright’s 
filtration test because this test roughly maps onto the traditional 
distinctiveness framework for conventional trademarks.  That is, 
while conventional trademarks are arrayed on a spectrum from 
unprotectable and generic to fanciful and distinctive, fictional 
marks derive their distinctiveness not by their relationship to the 
products to which they are affixed but from the level of creativity 
invested in them by their authors—a metric the filtration test was 
designed to measure.  The proposed strength of the mark analysis 
should be a thorough, probing inquiry into the degree of creativity 
invested in the fictional mark by its author.  At this stage, courts 
should note the degree to which the plot of the fictional work 
features the mark, the detail with which the mark is rendered and 
the actual memorability of the mark.  To the extent that there is 
any ambiguity in whether consumers have actually come to 
associate the mark with the entertainment work, courts should 
consider circumstantial evidence and, where available, empirical 
evidence of actual confusion in the form of consumer surveys, just 
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as they do under the conventional likelihood of confusion 
analysis.262 
Courts should understand the proximity of the goods factor as 
how closely the real-world product mimics the fictional one.  The 
goods will never be proximate in the conventional sense because 
the junior user is not selling entertainment, but rather, a tangible 
product.  This requirement should thus be understood not as 
whether the products are the same, but as whether the defendant’s 
product blurs the perspective between fantasy and reality, internal 
and external, as Duff Beer and The Daily Planet do. 
One last factor bears mentioning: the defendant’s intent in 
selecting the mark.  Courts should more readily infer bad faith on 
the part of a defendant in this context than in the traditional 
trademark framework.  Here, the specter of trading on the fame 
which is peculiarly associated with entertainment products hangs 
over every case.  Courts should have license to infer such bad faith 
from circumstantial evidence.  When, as in South Australian, the 
senior user has “wide distribution” and “deep market penetration,” 
this information should weigh heavily towards a finding of 
malicious intent by a junior user just as copyright more readily 
infers access when the original work is famous.263 
This Note now analyzes Powers and South Australian under 
the proposed framework and then considers other factual scenarios 
involving fictional trademarks. 
 
262  See, e.g., Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 
F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[s]urvey evidence may establish actual confusion” 
and that “evidence of actual confusion can . . . support a finding of likelihood of 
confusion” (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979))); 
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 638–39 (6th Cir. 2002) (“If a party 
chooses a mark with the intention of creating confusion between its products and those of 
another company, that fact alone may be sufficient to justify an inference of confusing 
similarity.  Circumstantial evidence of copying, particularly the use of a contested mark 
with knowledge of the protected mark at issue, is sufficient to support an inference of 
intentional infringement where direct evidence is not available.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 263 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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A. Rethinking Powers and South Australian Brewing Co. 
Powers and South Australian were well reasoned and rightly 
decided.  However, the courts in those cases viewed an unusual 
trademark problem through the lens of conventional trademark 
reasoning and in so doing, were hamstrung in their attempts to 
really explain the injury and why the remedy imposed was the 
correct one.  Under the tailored trademark analysis, Powers and 
South Australian would come out the same way, but this 
framework permits a court presented with those cases to address 
the priority issue head-on, to articulate those factors going to the 
distinctiveness of a fictional mark, and to more realistically assess 
the likelihood of confusion when a fictional trademark is 
appropriated. 
1. South Australian Brewing Co. 
Applying the fictional trademark framework to South 
Australian Brewing Company, a court would begin with the 
priority analysis.  At this stage, it would proceed as the South 
Australian court did.  It would emphasize Fox and Groening’s 
many attempts to link Duff Beer and The Simpsons in the public 
imagination, such as “[l]icensed merchandise relating specifically 
to ‘Duff Beer,’”264 and the evidence that Duff “appears in nearly 
all episodes of the series”265 including two episodes “substantially 
devoted” to the fictional beer: “Selma’s Choice” and “Duffless.”266  
The court would explain that Duff Beer’s originality and 
prominence on the show prevent it from being filtered away as 
mere scenes-à-faire.  It would also note at this stage The Simpsons 
comic books, which feature Duff, as evidence of the fictional 
mark’s presence across various media.  These factors all point to 
Fox and Groening’s having established priority in Duff.  The South 
Australian court reasoned by analogy to fictional characters to 
make this point, citing an earlier case involving Mickey and 
Minnie Mouse267 which held that these names were “so closely 
 
 264 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 
456 (Austl.). 
 265 Id. at 455. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 463 (quoting Radio Corp. Pty. v Disney [1937] 57 CLR 448, 453 (Austl.)). 
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associated in the public mind, with . . . [Walt] Disney and his 
activities” that the use of either the characters’ names or likenesses 
in connection with goods would suggest that the goods were 
“connected with . . . Disney.”268  Proceeding under this Note’s 
approach, the court could instead simply hold that under the 
totality of the circumstances, Fox and Groening’s efforts to forge 
the link between its fictional mark, Duff, and its entertainment 
property, The Simpsons in the public mind were substantial and 
numerous.  Accordingly, Duff Beer is a trademark for The 
Simpsons and the plaintiffs had established priority in the mark. 
In determining the likelihood of confusion, the court would 
begin by focusing on the strength of the mark, applying 
copyright’s abstraction test.  Indeed, the South Australian court 
essentially did so, without saying as much, and its approach is 
instructive on this point.  It emphasized the way the “‘make-
believe’ product” is “coupled with a character [Homer Simpson], a 
background institution, (Duff Brewery), and also with the 
associated advertising signs, posters and images of the beer, which 
play an important role in the series.”269  The court noted Duff’s 
role in the “fictional world which the characters inhabit”270 and 
reasoned that, “[n]o doubt, the assignation of the name ‘Duff’ to 
the product was likely designed to achieve a more believable 
specific fictional effect than to have an anonymous generic 
‘beer.’”271  In so doing, the South Australian court implied that 
Duff’s distinctiveness owes to the literary definition given to the 
fictional beer and the artistic originality it embodies, but proposes 
no test for measuring such distinctiveness.272  An “anonymous 
generic ‘beer’” could not realistically come to stand for the show 
in the public mind.  Accordingly, copyright’s filtration test would 
render it unprotectable scenes-à-faire.  But a court would almost 
certainly find that because Duff embodies a high degree of original 
 
 268 Id.  
 269 Id. at 465–66. 
270  Id. at 466. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Interestingly, the South Australian court also performed a traditional distinctiveness 
analysis.  Concluding that “‘Duff’ cannot be said to be descriptive of the beer’s qualities” 
id. at 463 it nevertheless determined that Duff had “acquired a powerful secondary 
meaning.” Id. at 465.   
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expression, it is indeed a memorable and distinct aspect of The 
Simpsons and therefore functions as a highly distinctive trademark 
for the show. 
Under proximity of the goods, courts compare the fictional 
product to its real-world counterpart.  In South Australian, the 
trade dress of the real-world beer was “said to be quite different 
from that featured [on] ‘The Simpsons.”273 Nevertheless, South 
Australian Brewing Company’s product was a beer bearing the 
name “Duff.”  Thus, while South Australian Brewing Company’s 
“Duff” is not a real-world replica of The Simpsons’ Duff, the beer 
does blur the perspective between fiction and reality to some 
degree.  The goods are therefore somewhat related under this 
factor. 
Finally, the South Australian court notes The Simpsons’ “wide 
coverage, deep market penetration and broad recognition”274 to 
suggest that Fox and Groening had established substantial good 
will in The Simpsons and in the fictional mark.275  The proposed 
framework, however, permits a double inference from The 
Simpsons’ market position: the existence of good will built up in 
the mark by Fox and an intent to trade on that good will by the 
breweries.  This factor, too, strongly suggests infringement. 
2. DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers 
Similarly, in DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers, the court began by 
shoehorning the fictional newspaper in with the Superman 
characters.  The court pointed to the existence of licensing 
agreements for “all the Superman characters” which led to the 
creation of merchandise featuring the fictional newspaper.276  The 
Powers court essentially reasoned that The Daily Planet functioned 
as a protectable character just as Superman did, and was licensed 
and promoted accordingly.  Under the proposed approach, 
however, the court would not have had to reason by analogy or 
bootstrap the fictional newspaper to the Superman characters.  It 
 
 273 Id. at 471. 
 274 Id. at 455. 
 275 Id. at 456. 
 276 DC Comics, Inc. v. Powers, 465 F. Supp. 843, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
C04_ARROW_011111_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2011  4:07 PM 
166 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:111 
could simply state that The Daily Planet is a prominent and well-
delineated ingredient of DC’s protectable entertainment work, 
Superman, and DC has made substantial efforts to link the fictional 
newspaper and the Superman franchise in the public mind.  It 
would then marshal the evidence of the licensing agreements and 
would note that The Daily Planet is a well-defined newspaper, 
playing a central role in the series.  Not only does the paper have a 
recognizable title, masthead, and office building, but it employs 
nearly all the characters in the series, including the Man of Steel 
himself (incognito as his handsome, but bumbling alter ego, Clark 
Kent), Superman’s love interest Lois Lane, and a photographer 
named Jimmy Olsen whose interest in Lane forms a love triangle 
in the series.277  Based on its dramatic role in the Superman series, 
The Daily Planet thus survives even a very stringent filtration 
analysis.  The court would then conclude that based on the totality 
of the circumstances, DC Comics had established The Daily Planet 
as a protectable trademark and having used the mark in commerce, 
had reserved priority rights in it. 
The court would then proceed to the likelihood of confusion 
analysis.  Under strength of the mark, a court would likely find that 
the level of distinctiveness of The Daily Planet is high, owing not 
to the uniqueness of the name as applied to a newspaper (which 
under the conventional trademark analysis would likely be found 
to be on the borderline between a descriptive and a suggestive 
mark, and thus possibly unprotectable absent secondary meaning) 
but rather, to the fictional newspaper’s dramatic role in the series.  
Indeed, it is precisely because The Daily Planet calls to mind the 
Superman characters and story, and not that it is a particularly 
unusual name for a newspaper, that it serves as a potent trademark 
for the series. 
Under proximity of the goods, the court would note that 
Powers’ Daily Planet employed “a masthead which was an exact 
replica of the Daily Planet insignia appearing in numerous 
 
277  See generally Superman Episode Guide (1968), THE BIG CARTOON DATABASE, 
http://www.bcdb.com/cartoons/Filmation_Associates/A-G/Batman_Superman_Hour/ 
Superman (last visited Jan. 4, 2011). 
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Superman comic books.”278  This factor cuts strongly in favor of a 
finding of infringement. 
When discussing the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, 
the Powers court’s reasoning is instructive.  Noting the appearance 
of drawings of Superman and the use of the Superman character in 
its articles, including one titled “Superman smokes super dope”279 
the court found Powers’ adoption of the name The Daily Planet to 
be “merely an attempt to cash in on the Superman story and its 
notoriety.”280  Indeed, as Powers himself admitted in his affidavit 
“that he was aware of the relationship between the Daily Planet 
and the Superman story when he first decided to use the name,” the 
Powers court rightly identified the link between bad faith in 
selecting the name The Daily Planet and the fame of the Superman 
story.281  A court applying the proposed framework would proceed 
in the same manner at this step. 
B. Notes on Tailored Trademark from Other Factual Scenarios 
This Note now briefly considers a few other fictional 
trademark scenarios which illustrate the proposed framework 
applied in practice. 
Perhaps the best weapon in the war against fictional trademark 
infringement is the licensing agreement.  In the race to bring 
fictional products to real-world markets, no licensing company 
rivals Omni Consumer Products Corporation.282  Named for the 
“fictional megacorporation” from the film, “Robocop,”283 this 
“defictionalizing company” enjoys licenses to produce real-world 
versions of Tru Blood, the fictional blood substitute for vampires 
from the HBO television series of the same name;284 Sex Panther, 
the fictional cologne from the 2004 Will Ferrell film, Anchorman: 
the Legend of Ron Burgundy; and Stay Puft marshmallows, whose 
 
 278 Powers, 465 F. Supp. at 849. 
 279 Id.   
 280 Id.   
 281 Id. 
 282 OMNI CONSUMER PRODS. CORP., http://www.omniconsumerproductscorporation.com 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
 283 Rob Walker, This Joke’s for You, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2008/05/04/magazine/04wwln-consumed-t.html. 
 284 Mercifully, the real-world version is a blood orange soda. 
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fictional spokesman, the Stay Puft Marshmallow Man, famously 
wreaks havoc in midtown Manhattan in the climax of the 1984 
film, Ghostbusters.285  Each of these products is, of course, 
perfectly legal and produced pursuant to a licensing agreement.  
But assuming for a moment that such products were produced 
without a license, an analysis of the fictional trademarks upon 
which they are based illuminates how a court might apply the 
tailored trademark framework proposed in this Note under related, 
but distinct factual scenarios. 
Firstly, it would be hard to imagine a more successful effort to 
reserve priority in a fictional mark than that made by HBO in its 
use of Tru Blood.  In addition to being the title of the container 
entertainment work, True Blood, the fictional product Tru Blood 
plays a pervasive dramatic role in the series; indeed, in the series, it 
represents a technological breakthrough which permits vampires to 
live in (tenuous) harmony with the living.  Vampires are depicted 
chugging this fictional product out of a stout glass bottle with a 
recognizable red and yellow logo in nearly every episode of the 
show.286  Accordingly, Tru Blood sails through the priority 
analysis because of the creativity invested in it by the show’s 
creators (it is the lynchpin of the plot of the entire series) and its 
pervasiveness on the series.  However, both factors do not 
necessarily need to be present in equal amounts for a fictional 
trademark proprietor to succeed in linking its fictional mark and 
the entertainment work in which it is embedded. 
In Anchorman: The Legend of Ron Burgundy,287 Paul Rudd’s 
caddish, mustachioed television reporter, Brian Fantana, hatches a 
scheme to woo a female television anchor with the help of a 
fictional cologne called “Sex Panther.”288  In the movie, the 
fictional cologne is “illegal in nine countries,” (presumably 
because it is “made with bits of real panther”) and has been 
subjected to studies which indicate that “60% of the time, it works 
 
 285 OMNI CONSUMER PRODS. CORP., supra note 282. 
286  See generally HBO, TRUE BLOOD, http://www.hbo.com/true-blood/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
 287 ANCHORMAN: THE LEGEND OF RON BURGUNDY (Dreamworks Pictures 2004). 
 288 Id. 
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every time.”289  The absurdity of the fictional cologne, as well as 
the scene in which Fantana’s scheme predictably flops, manifests a 
high degree of creativity and causes Sex Panther to serve as a 
potent trademark for Anchorman despite its only appearing in a 
few brief minutes of the film.  The success of the licensed, real-
world version of Sex Panther provides strong circumstantial 
evidence that consumers do, in fact, associate Sex Panther with 
Anchorman and that its caché among consumers is predicated 
almost entirely upon this association.  Indeed, as the South 
Australian court noted with regard to the fictional Duff, “it would 
be artificial in the extreme to suggest that consumers would be 
attracted by the concept of [Sex Panther] on the basis of its 
dictionary meaning” alone.290  Accordingly, at the priority step, 
pervasiveness and distinctiveness should be understood to exist on 
a sliding scale, such that a plaintiff could succeed in establishing 
priority with a high degree of either or a modest amount of both. 
Finally, while Stay Puft marshmallows have yet to be released, 
their success in the marketplace would give courts another metric 
by which to evaluate a fictional trademark proprietor’s success in 
transforming a fictional product into a real-world trademark: 
duration of the association.  It has been twenty-six years since the 
Ghostbusters’ showdown with the Stay Puft Marshmallow Man.291  
The success of defictionalized Stay Puft marshmallows a quarter 
century later would represent strong circumstantial evidence of the 
strength of the mark. 
Yet another instructive example of a fictional trademark 
creator’s efforts to encourage the public to associate a fictional 
mark with a real-world entertainment product is Dunder Mifflin, 
the fictional paper company of NBC’s television show The Office.  
The fictional Dunder Mifflin maintains a real-world Internet 
presence292 with an elaborate website announcing fictional 
 
 289 Id. 
 290 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451, 
465 (Austl.). 
 291 GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 1984). 
 292 DUNDER MIFFLIN, A MICRO-CAP REGIONAL PAPER AND OFFICE SUPPLY DISTRIBUTOR, 
http://www.dundermifflin.com (last visited May 28, 2010). 
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corporate environmental initiatives,293 and the company’s fictional 
acquisition by another fictional company, Sabre Corp.294  The site 
also features a complete archive of (hilarious) fictional company 
newsletters.295  The site is so richly detailed that one could spend 
hours on it before getting linked back into its web host, nbc.com.  
In this way, the website stealthily advertises for the show while 
masquerading as the public profile of Dunder Mifflin.  In other 
words, it pulls the user into the internal perspective of The Office 
where Dunder Mifflin is real and marvelously mediocre.  NBC 
thus uses Dunder Mifflin in at least two ways to reserve priority in 
the mark: as the fictional workplace around which the plot of The 
Office centers—much like the way The Daily Planet functions in 
Superman—and in real-world, on-line advertising for the show.296  
Its perspective-warping website would also weigh heavily in 
NBC’s favor in an infringement suit under the “proximity of the 
goods” factor because the more a company pulls us into its 
fictional world with a fictional trademark, the more likely any 
second-comer’s goods are to create marketplace confusion. 
Another interesting “proximity” issue is raised by use of a 
fictional trademark on real-world goods which are not exact 
analogues of their fictional counterparts.  In DC Comics v. 
Kryptonite Corp., DC Comics sued defendant Kryptonite Corp., a 
manufacturer of bicycle locks which had licensed the name of the 
fictional element from DC, when Kryptonite went beyond the 
bounds of the licensing agreement.297  Kryptonite was, of course, 
not manufacturing a green, glowing space mineral, but earthly 
security devices.  While this fact cuts in favor of Kryptonite under 
the “proximity of the goods factor,” it is important to recognize 
that, in fictional trademark cases, the goods are almost never 
 
 293 Id. (“Dunder Mifflin is committed to improving the environment.  That’s why we 
plant a tree for each and every metric ton of paper that we ship.”). 
 294 SABRE CORP., http://www.sabre-corp.com/news-012010.shtml (last visited May 28, 
2010). 
 295 Contact, DUNDER MIFFLIN, A MICRO-CAP REGIONAL PAPER AND OFFICE SUPPLY 
DISTRIBUTOR, http://www.dundermifflin.com/contact (last visited May 28, 2010). 
 296 That the site also sells licensed Office merchandise further strengthens NBC’s claim 
of priority under the framework proposed in this Note. 
297  See DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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proximate in the traditional trademark sense.298  Thus, the kind of 
“nonparallel” use at issue in Kryptonite represents merely a 
difference of degree, but not of kind, from the more typical real-
product-that-appears-to-be-the-fictional-product injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Homer Simpson is not just a guy and Moe’s Tavern is not just 
a bar.  These represent valuable intellectual property assets which 
in many ways serve as conventional trademarks.  A fictional 
trademark functions no differently than a fictional character in 
terms of its ability to designate the source of an entertainment 
product, but because it appears to be a trademark for a fictional 
good, rather than the entertainment work in which it is embedded, 
it blurs our perspective and our ability to understand its ontological 
function. 
This Note locates fictional trademark injuries under trademark 
law but proposes adapting the trademark framework to the 
particulars of the fictional trademark problem.  This tailored 
trademark framework borrows analytical principles from copyright 
to determine what a use in commerce sufficient to reserve priority 
in a mark might look like for a fictional trademark, and to 
determine if a fictional trademark has been infringed.  Conceiving 
of fictional trademarks as real-world trademarks for their 
associated entertainment products and modifying the trademark 
analysis to evaluate the strength of those trademarks will help 
protect valuable intellectual property rights in these entertainment 
products. 
 
 298 Filmation proved the rare exception.  There, DC Comics used its characters as 
trademarks for its entertainment products: the shows Aquaman and Plastic Man, which 
defendant Filmation’s entertainment products, the shows Manta and Moray and 
Superstretch, were found to infringe. DC Comics, Inc., v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. 
Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See infra Part I.A. 
